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INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with U.S. international policy regarding direct broadcast satellites (DBS). DBS satellites broadcast
radio and television signals from 22,300 miles above the equator
directly to homes equipped with small receiver dishes. Present
U.S. DBS policy is at odds with the great majority of the nations of
the world, including countries having relatively open and closed
mass communication systems. The U.S. position insists upon the
absolute right of every state and person to engage in transborder
communications by DBS and upon the free flow of information
among countries of the world without regard to borders or frontiers. This paper analyzes U.S. DBS free flow policy and its practical implications by drawing upon and comparing domestic broadcast policy and practice.
Part I sets forth the three main policy proposals for DBS thus
far advanced and their supporting rationales. Part II describes the
structural decisions made and being made regarding DBS technology, the accretion of influence which early decisions regarding
new communications technology tend to have, and the significance
of threshold structural decisions for development of international
DBS service. Parts III and IV explore the alternative operational
models available for international DBS service, the relationship of
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these models to the three major policy proposals, and the type of
programming likely to result under these models.
Part V explores the potential economic, administrative and
political costs of U.S. DBS policy and the practical implications of
the free flow position.
Part VI distinguishes U.S. DBS policy from its policy on international human rights and press freedom, and then compares U.S.
international and domestic broadcast policy. The affirmative
theory of the first amendment is developed as an alternative to
the U.S. absolutist free flow position. Part VII considers the affirmative first amendment theory as it contrasts with the three main
policy proposals for DBS, and discusses the opportunity for congruity between U.S. domestic and international broadcast policy
under the affirmative theory.
Part VIII considers more particularly the ways in which accommodation might be reached on the actual operation of an international DBS system by comparing the rules and practices of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), operating under the
Communications Act of 1934, with general and specific recommendations of the MacBride Commission Report on international communication problems. The possibilities of harmony between the
Communications Act and the MacBride Report and the responsiveness of various domestic initiatives to specific concerns raised
by the MacBride Commission are also developed.
The paper concludes that present U.S. international DBS
policy (i) is fundamentally inconsistent with domestic broadcast
law and practice; (ii) may ultimately undermine the U.S. objective
of encouraging communication in the international community;
and (iii) may threaten U.S. economic interests at home and abroad.
The conclusion further suggests that advancement by the U.S. of a
free flow position may do a disservice to its own rich experience in
reconciling communication values with new communication technology, may deprive other nations of the benefits of this applied
knowledge, and could delay realization of the great cross-cultural
communication potential of DBS technology. 1
1. The complex and many-faceted questions surrounding DBS technology and use
have attracted much scholarly attention. For background on the subject, see generally, C.
ALEXANDROWICZ, THE LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (1971); ASPEN INSTITUTE PROGRAM
ON COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY, CONTROL OF THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: VALUES
IN CONFLICT (1974); A. CHAYES, J. FAWCETT, M. ITO & A. KISS, SATELLITE BROADCASTING
(1973); I. DE SOLA POOL, THE SATELLITE BROADCAST CONTROVERSY (1974); T. EMERSON, THE
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PRESENT POLICY PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL
DBS SERVICE

Since the advent of the satellite technology in the early 1960s,
international concern has focused upon the potential use of satellites to broadcast radio and television signals directly into homes
across national borders. Unlike the mails and point-to-point telecommunication services passing through national gateways, direct
broadcast satellites allow a transmitting state or private entity to
reach citizens of another state without the receiving state's cooperation or consent. And unlike terrestrial broadcasting, which is
limited in its penetration of foreign borders, 2 a single DBS signal
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); E. GALLOWAY, THE POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF
SATELLITE COMMUNICATION (1972); P. LASKIN & A. CHAYES, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM
SATELLITES: POLICIES AND PROBLEMS (1975); D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM (1970); THE INTERNATIONAL LA.W OF COMMUNICATIONS (E. McWhinney ed. 1971); UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD: COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY TODAY AND TOMORROW (1980). See also Chayes & Chazen, Policy
Problems in Direct Broadcasting from Satellites, 5 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 4 (1970); The Control of Program Content in International Telecommunications (The Friedmann Series in International Law), 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1-81 (1974); Dauses, Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellites and the Freedom of Information, 3 J. SPACE L. 59 (1975); Special Project,
Direct Broadcast Satellites and Space Law Symposium, 3 J. SPACE L. 107 (1975); Grad &
Goldfarb, Government Regulation of International Telecommunications, 15 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 386 (1976); LeDuc, Transforming Principles into Policy 30/2 J. COM. 196
(1980); Powell, Direct Broadcast Satellites: The Conceptual Convergence of the Free Flow
of Information and National Sovereignty, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1975); Price, The First
Amendment and Television Broadcasting by Satellite., 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 879 (1976); Rice,
Regulation of DBS: International Constraints and Domestic Options, 25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
813 (1980); Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: the 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1980); Ruddy, American Constitutional Law and Restrictions on the Content of
Private International Broadcasting, 5 INT'L LAW 102 (1971); Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: The ITU in a Changing World, 13 INT'L LAW 289 (1979);
Rutkowski, United States Policy Making for the International Forums on Communication,
8 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 95 (1980); Snow, INTELSAT: An International Example, 30/2 J.
COM. 147 (1980). See also, Comment, Direct Satellite Broadcasting and the First Amendment, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 514 (1974); Note, Direct Broadcast Satellites and Freedom of
Speech, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 374 (1974); Note, Radio Propaganda in the Contexts of International Regulation and the Free Flow of Information as a Human Right, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L
L. 154 (1979); Note, Toward the Free Flow of Information: Direct Television Broadcasting
Via Satellite, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 329 (1979).
2. Until recently, terrestrial broadcast stations could expect to serve an area with a
radius no greater than about 100 miles. Class I stations, operating on clear channels at not
less than 10 kw power (and usually operating at 50 kw) could serve such an area. More
recently, "superstations" operating at up to 500 kws have been proposed; these statiom
could serve an area with a radius over 400 miles. Although such a proposed service area is
much larger than conventional broadcast coverage, it is still infinitesimal compared to the
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can cover forty percent of the earth's surface, encompassing many
countries and cultures. 3 The unique communication potential of
DBS has spawned major international debate reflecting the hopes
and fears of diverse societies for this new technology. 4 Although
the issues of DBS have been deliberated extensively for nearly
two decades in a multiplicity of international public and private
forums, unfortunately, little agreement has been achieved. 5
The countries of the world have been aligned in three groups
over the question of DBS. The largest group, led by the U.S.S.R.,
has argued for the absolute sovereign right of every state to control communications coming within its borders in order to protect
the integrity of its domestic communication system and cultural
values. This group has also sought the adoption of an international
area of service possible from a satellite in geostationary orbit. Shortwave radio is capable of
covering greater distances, but is technologically inferior as a medium of communication to
AM, FM and TV spectrum frequencies.
3. Coverage possible from a single satellite under ideal conditions would be one-third
to 40% of the earth. "Broadcasting from Satellites," Working Paper of Canada and Sweden,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/49, Appendix 7, at 90 (1979).
The concept of resource scarcity is a familiar one in communications law; it underlies,
along with the obvious need for careful coordination and cooperation, the domestic government's right to regulate, and is the tacit assumption upon which international a priori - a
posteriori discussions are grounded. Mr. Justice White noted in 1969 that scarcity of usable
spectrum space might not remain a dispositive consideration, since technological
developments would tend to make more spectrum, and more efficient methods of its use,
available. The latter, at least, has proved true, and progress continues. It is remarkable,
however, that such extensions of the limits of this natural resource do not in fact cure the
problem of scarcity, since use and demand also continue to grow. One can assume from past
developments and reasonable probabilities that demand will continue to exceed supply.
Direct broadcasting from satellites entails the use of the geostationary oribt, a band
of outer space roughly 36,000 km. from the earth and located over the equator. It is practicable within this band to maintain a satellite in geosynchronous orbit, that is, in a virtually
constant position relative to the earth; such a satellite offers obvious advantages over the
original "tracking" satellites, which are in constant motion around the earth. Because this
geostationary orbit band has physical boundaries, the resource is clearly limited. Early
stages of geostationary orbit development, some fifteen years ago, offered roughly 180
satellite "slots"; although advanced tecnhology has served, by decreasing interference and
"stacking" satellites, to triple that number, it is clear that the band is finite and that concerns of scarcity continue to be valid.
4. Major forums of debate have included the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU), infra note 11; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), infra section IX; and the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), whose Scientific and Technical Subcommittee
recommended in 1964 that intensive study of DBS be undertaken; the UNCOPUOS Working
Group on DBS was formed in 1968 as a direct response to this suggestion.
5. A summary report of the remarks of representatives to the Working Group on
DBS, of COPUOS, found at U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.310 (1979), makes clear just how little agreement there is.
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code governing the content of all DBS programs; the code would
prohibit broadcast of material which (i) threatened international
peace; (ii) interfered with the internal affairs of another state; (iii)
encroached on fundamental freedoms, specifically the right to be
free from discrimination based on race, sex, language or religion;
(iv) propagandized or promoted violence, horrors, pornography,
and the use of narcotics; (v) misinformed the public on local culture
and traditions; or (vi) misinformed the public on these matters. 6
The second group of states, led by Canada and Sweden, has
also accepted the sovereign right of a state to control the content
of DBS programs broadcast into its territory, but has · resisted
adoption of an international DBS programming code. Instead, this
group has proposed regional and bilateral arrangements for international DBS service which insure that all recipient states participate in the production of imported programming. 7
The U.S., sometimes standing alone, has steadfastly rejected
the sovereign right to prior consent to transborder communication
and has argued for a free flow of information in the international
community. The U.S. has urged a close relationship between the
free flow of information and the realization of the individual right
to form tastes, opinions and beliefs freely through access to a suitable array of ideas and values. The U.S. has feared that this fundamental right would be seriously compromised, domestically and
internationally, by either the adoption of an international code of
DBS programming content or the establishment of international
institutional arrangements to govern the conduct of DBS operations.8 Although the U.S. has acknowledged the generalized duty
of every state to respect the cultural traditions and sensibilities of
other states, it has asserted that this would best be achieved
through decentralized, private arrangements, without the involvement of public international authorities. 9
6. U.S.S.R. Working Papers, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117, Annex III (1972) and U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/127 Annex II (1974).
7. Canadian-Swedish proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117, Annex IV (1973) and U.N.
Doc. A/AC.1051127, Annex IV (1979).
8. U.S. proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/127, Annex IV (1979); see also remarks of U.S.
representative in summary, supra note 5.
9. See Chayes & Laskin, A Report of the Panel on International Telecommunications Policy, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM
SATELLITES: POLICIES AND PROBLEMS 1 (1975). One of the most scholarly considerations 'to
date of. U.S. international DBS policy, the Report suggested that three principles had to be
balanced to formulate an international framework for direct satellite broadcasting: the free
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The failure to reach accommodation on international DBS service has reached an important point. Development of DBS technology is progressing rapidly, and critical structural and operational
decisions have been and are being made on its implementation,
scheduled to begin around 1985. 10 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 11 an independent United Nations (U.N.)
flow of information, the value of cultural diversity, and the right of every nation to determine for itself the scope and character of the television services available to its people.
The Report criticized the Soviet proposals for DBS programming codes as impractical
in concept and scope and as an unwarranted sacrifice of the principle of the free flow of information and ideas. The Panel doubted that precise meanings could be attached to the
language of the proposed code sufficient to form a consensus, which is rare even within a
single society. It believed that amendment of the code in response to accumulated experience would be exceedingly difficult, resulting in excessive rigidity at a time when DBS
needed flexibility to develop regional and national programming acceptable to the vast new
audiences.
Two weaknesses were cited in the Canada-Sweden proposal of prior consent coupled
with recipient state participation in program production. First, the Panel found no limitation on the right of a state to withhold consent in disregard of international standards, principles or obligations. It believed the latitude thus implied in the Canada-Sweden position
was too broad and that states should be bound by the developing norms of the international
community in exercising control over transborder DBS television. The second major deficiency in the proposal cited was that it seemed to allow for program-by-program refusal by
states. The Panel was concerned that should the right to prior consent be exercised on a
per-program basis, it would allow a type of prior review and restraint offensive to free
speech tradition, or would, at best, result in overwhelming administrative backlogs, inhibiting the free flow of ideas. Finally, the Panel feared that program-by-program approval
would disserve DBS development by rendering audience access too uncertain to justify the
heavy initial investment in satellite hardware and programming necessary to start up a
system. Long-term, assured access to the intended audience was seen as critical to public
and private investment in international DBS services.
The Panel Report was also critical of the U.S. position, finding that it failed to give
proper weight to the interest in diversity and the desire of states to determine for
themselves their national television services. The Panel found the U.S. to be in a unique
position in the DBS field, unthreatened by foreign program service because of the cultural
and linguistic isolation, a highly viable domestic television system, and superiority in satellite technology.
The Report of the Panel concluded that there is a widespread unwillingness among
nations to accept a laissez-faire attitude toward transborder direct broadcasting, but that
there is little agreement as to the scope and character of the necessary regulation.
10. This estimate was made by the Satellite Television Corporation (STC), a division
of the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), in its April 1981 application to the
FCC for authority to build and launch one or more direct broadcast satellites. BROADCASTING, July 6, 1981, at 30.
11. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), founded in 1865 as the International Telegraph Union, is the oldest international agency, and the one central to the
achievement of international agreement on the use of telecommunications. The dual purposes stated by the ITU are to increase cooperation and to decrease harmful spectrum interference between nations. The Radio Regulations of the ITU provide specific controls
over communications; periodic World Administrative Radio Conferences (W ARCs) are held
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agency, has divided the countries of the world into three regions, 12
and in two of these regions satellite orbital positions and frequencies have already been assigned. 13 Out of the hundreds of DBS
assignments made in these two regions, only nine nations made
reservations for international service; 14 and the three services so
involved are all marked by close cultural and religious
transborder identification. The individual nations rece1vmg
assignments are already developing operational plans for national
DBS systems which may limit future opportunities for international service. U.S. satellite operators have expressed their views
to the FCC on the importance of initial decisions regarding allocations of geostationary orbit space. 15 No reservation has thus far
to update or modify these guidelines. These regulations, like the Convention itself, bind
signatory nations (of whom there are presently 154) with the authority of a treaty.
The ITU is organized in three plenary bodies: the Plenipotentiary Conference, which
holds supreme authority and deals with the ITU's structure and finances; the Administrative Conference, discussed above; and the International Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), which makes non-binding recommendations. See, Rice, Regulation of DBS: International Constraints and Domestic Options, 25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV . 813 (1980), note 4-18 and
accompanying text; Jacobson, International Institutions for Telecommunications: the ITU's
Role, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 51 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971).
12. Region I includes Africa, Europe and the Middle East; Region II - the Western
Hemsphere, including Greenland, and Region III - Asia (including the USSR), Australia and
the South Pacific. Although there was discussion at the 1979 WARC of creating a fourth
region, comprised solely of Africa, the representatives of the African nations were unable to
achieve the degree of unity necessary to accomplish this. Hart, A Review of WARC- '79, 2
CoM. & L. 21, 29 n.33 (1980).
13. Regions I and III worked out their frequency allocations at the 1977 W ARC; the
agreements came into force on Jan. l, 1979. Final Acts, World Broadcasting-Satellite Administrative Radio Conference, ITU, Geneva, 1977.
14. The reservations for international service were all made within Region I, and
were as follows: Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden made reservation as
NORDSAT; Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Syria reserved for the Islamic Network (still prospective); and the Vatican reserved for broadcast throughout Italy.
15. Major U.S. communications· satellite operators have urged the FCC to retain as
much flexibility as possible in any geostationary orbit allocations to be made at the Space
W ARC in 1984. Rigidity in such allocations can result in waste and in poorly developed services. Such operators as COMSAT, AT&T, Southern Pacific Communications and Satellite
Business Systems would prefer to keep the present (a posteriori) allocation system, but that
seems impossible given the new balance of powers in the ITU. Various proposals for allocation are presently under study by the International Radio Consultative Committee of the
ITU, and the domestic operators urge the formation of a U.S. government industrial advisory committee. It is also recommended that whatever allocations are made be temporary
or time-limited, since predictions about technological developments and service requirements over a span of years are bound to be inaccurate. The operators stress the possibility
of irreversible damage which might result from rigid assignments now, and emphasize the
need to stimulate and encourage development of communications capacities to the greatest
extent possible.
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been made for use by the U .N. or its affiliated committees and
organizations, nor for the European Economic Community or any
of its related agencies. Region II, which includes North, Central
and South America and the Caribbean, will determine its DBS service assignments in 1983 at a Regional Administrative Radio Conference (RARC) in Rio de Janeiro. At present, no plans have been
developed for international DBS service to the people of the
Western Hemisphere.

III

DURABILITY OF INITIAL STRUCTURAL AND
OPERATIONAL DECISIONS

Structural and operational decisions 16 regarding the implementation of new communication technology have had enduring
importance, sometimes long surviving their initial rationales and
technological advances. Increasingly complex economic, institutional and technical arrangements build and depend upon the
threshold decisions of what spectrum resources will be allocated
to the new service, what entities will have the opportunity to provide the service, and how the service will be operated and
regulated. These initial decisions limit future policy and institutional options.
The development of U.S. terrestrial broadcast service and the
early alloc:ation of radio frequencies among countries in the Americas illustrate the longevity of formative decisions. The threshold
structural decisions made by the 1934 Congress (at a time when
only AM radio existed) as to spectrum access, ownership, management and regulation of broadcast stations have survived generations of new mass communications technologies and service. 11 The
1934 Communications Act, only slightly amended, remains the cor-

16. Structural and operational regulation of communication services is distinguishable
from content regulation. Structural regualtion seeks to encourage programming service in
the public interest indirectly through control of industry composition and firm conduct. Content regulation involves direct review and control of programs and schedules. See Inquiry
and Proposed Rulemaking; Deregulation of Radio, 44 Fed. Reg. 57,636, 57,662-668 (1979).
17. 47 U.S.C. §§151-607 (1976) (as amended) [hereinafter cited as Communications Act].
Although the Communications Act states clearly that a license to spectrum use carries no property rights or ownership, it is undeniable that broadcasters do feel that they
have rights to this resource. This belief is encouraged by the necessity of making sizable initial investments, as well as by the need for continuity of service. While each license bears a
clear statement that no property rights attach, the desire for maximum service has
necessitated at least tacit assurances of permanence, thus allowing broadcasters to build
stable audience bases and to realize return on their investments.
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nerstone of domestic broadcast law. 18 Likewise the spectrum allocation decisions made by the Federal Communications Commission in 1952 for VHF television, which provided for at least three
stations to every major city in the country, 19 rapidly resulted in the
development of the three national commercial networks, which are
today unchallenged in their dominance of the U.S. television industry.
An example of the durability of international structural decisions20 is the recent dispute regarding the FCC proposal to decrease spacing of AM radio frequency allocations in Region II from
18. Although the FCC has recently deregulated domestic radio broadcasters, relieving them of past public interest obligations, the deregulation rules left intact the radio
broadcasters' fairness and equal opportunity responsibilities, and were passed on broadcaster assurances that broadcasters would be as, or more, responsive to public needs and interests without regulation as with. Moreover, the Commission has indicated its readine~ to
reassert regulatory controls should it determine that deregulation is not serving the public
interest.
The commercial radio deregulation rules eliminated (i) guidelines requiring the presentation by licensees of specified levels of non-entertainment programming, (ii) formal community ascertainment procedures, (iii) guidelines limiting the air time devoted to commercial advertising, and (iv) rules requiring the maintenance of comprehensive program logs.
Report and Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981). The Commission concluded that with over
8,900 radio stations transmitting in the country, there was sufficient competition within the
industry so that market forces would be a better determinant of station conduct than
regulation. DBS technology is, obviously, at a very different stage of development.
19. In 1952, the FCC added 70 UHF (470-890 MHz) channels to the twelve existing
VHF (54-216 MHz) channels, and made more than 2,000 channel assignments in about 1300
communities. Faced with the alternatives of creating clear channels, where broadcasting
would be regional or even nationwide, or local service, where broadcasting would serve
small locales, the FCC opted for the latter. Clear channel service would have provided six or
seven stations to each receiver regardless of location, but would have afforded fewer broadcasters the opportunity to participate; programming would have been on a national or largeregion scale. The allocation method chosen provided an average of three stations per
receiver (more in densely populated areas), but was designed to allow reflection of local
needs and interests, and to afford many broadcasters the oppotunity to participate. Programming was foreseen as specific to the locale.
The inefficiencies which resulted (e.g., service assignments in unpopulated areas, or
areas so sparsely populated as to preclude development of local service, and allocation
shortages in densely populated areas) have often been complained of. In addition, one of the
major reasons for choosing the local-oriented formula, i.e. the fear of "homogenization" of
the nation through national, lowest-common-denominator programming for clear channels,
seems to have been as fully realized through networking - at least this is a charge often
levied by critics of contemporary television service in the U.S. See, LEDUC, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL (1973).
20. FCC Commissioner Cross remarked in 1960, during Congress' deliberations on
whether to ratify the 1950 North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA);
"Each new international agreement in this complex and fast-growing field is more difficult
to negotiate than its predecessor." Exec. Report No. 2, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
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10 kHz to 9 kHz. 21 Region II spectrum allocations, based upon 10
kHz spaces between assigned frequencies, were originally made in
1937;22 major adjustments (preceded by years of conferences and
discussions) were made in 1950. 23 The spacing rearrangement proposed in 1979 by the FCC was technologically feasible within varying cost estimates, 24 and offered th~ provision of twelve new channels and up to 1400 new stations. The reassignment was strongly
resisted, however, by established domestic and foreign broadcasters.25 They argued that the cost to convert would be high, not
only in terms of engineering and materials, but also in terms of
station identification and advertising; and that there was reason
to believe that these costs would fall unevenly among stations and
21. Three years ago, the Daytime Broadcasters Association (DBA), in hopes of gaining
full-time frequency allocations, took up the cause of decreasing AM frequency spacing. The
National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA), then headed by Henry
Geller, proposed the idea to the FCC by peition filed Ja:n. 10, 1979. The DBA and NTIA
were joined by others seeking spectrum access - the National Black Media Coalition
(NBMC), National Public Radio (NPR), and the Cubans, for example. Cuba had long been
agitating for more spectrum space and less interference from U.S. stations, and had
threatened to install two 500-watt superstations on frequencies duplicating two Florida stations. (By at least one estimation, that of William Salmon, special assistant to James
Buckley, Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, the
threat was an idle one; Cuba has inadequate power resources to support such broadcasting.
BROADCASTING, Nov. 9, 1981, at 44, 46. The possibility of Cuban superstations was, however,
seen by most as real). Although no promises were ever made, many hoped that the new
assignments, in providing Cuba with more stations, would quell this threat. The FCC made
its formal proposal in Notice of Inquiry in the Matter of 9kHz Channel Spacing for AM
Broadcasting, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,550 (1979).
22. Inter-American Radio Communications Convention, Dec. 13, 1937, with Annexes,
53 Stat. 1576, T.S. No. 938, reprinted in 3 BEAVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 462 (1969). This Convention included the Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay and the United States. It was signed in Havana on December 13, 1937.
23. North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, Nov. 15, 1950, 11 U.S.T. 413,
T.l.A.S. No. 4460. This Agreement (NARBA) involved the Bahamas, Canada, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic and the United States. (A separate agreement between Mexico and the
U.S. was concluded later that year). NARBA was signed in Washington in November 1950,
although it wasn't ratified by the U.S. until ten years later.
24. The estimates originally given by the FCC were substantially lower than those
provided by the industry, or by industry-retained research groups. Aggregate engineering
costs involved in station conversions have been estimated at from twenty million dollars
(original FCC estimate) to forty-three million dollars (private research group). BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 29.
25. The provision of new channels would result in increased competition and, by all
estimates, in at least a minimal increase in interference. The FCC originally estimated
overall service area losses of 2.4%-5%. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 29. A Canadian
study, however, found probable service area losses of up to 45%, with 50% of all broadcasters bearing losses of at least 5%. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 7.
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cause greater hardship in some states than in others. 26 Resistance
from the U.S. National Association of Broadcasters and from conservative sources within the FCC itself was supported by Canada
and other countries in Region 11. 27 The FCC finally withdrew its
proposal in August 1981. 28
Threshold structural and operational decisions regarding the
implementation of DBS broadcast service will be equally influential upon future development. Although DBS assignments on an
exclusive, or nearly exclusive, national basis would not preclude
future transborder arrangements, international DBS service will
be more readily realized if multilateral and regional reservations
are provided for in the initial table of assignments. While early
structural decisions are not unalterable, and the states in Regions
I and III could eventually make arrangements for additional international broad.c asting, reaching such subsequent international
agreement may be difficult and cumbersome. Reservation of spectrum and orbital slots for international satellite channels in
Region II, even if there presently existed only tentative institu26. Because the decreased spacing would cause some established stations to shift by
up to 9 kHz (by an early Canadian proposal), or up to 4 kHz (by the American plan) while
leaving others virtually unchanged, cost to each station would be determined by the difference between its old and its new assignments. BROADCASTING, June 15, 1981, at 71.
27. In addition, domestic manufacturers supported the status quo, pointing out that
German and Japanese manufacturers were already geared to produce technology based on 9
kHz, creating a distinct disadvantage to American industry. Furthermore, some one million
digitally-tuned receivers would be rendered totally obsolete, and a further four million
would be impaired. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 29.
Had the FCC membership remained constant, the question of a shift of 9 kHz spacing
would probably still be viable; but a new, industry-oriented Commission joined with a newchaired NTIA to quash the proposal. Henry Geller was replaced at NTIA by Bernard J.
Wunder, who favored retention of 10 kHz spacing; Geller had been a strong proponent of
the change. Charles Ferris, another supporter of the proposal, was replaced at the FCC by
Mark Fowler, a leader in the opposition to reassignment. The FCC added a new member
shortly before the decision - Mimi Weyforth Dawson, who was also opposed to the change.
A couple of members who had earlier supported the reallocation changed their minds; support for the status quo was also lent by State Department Under-Secretary for Security
Assistance, Science and Technology, James L. Buckley. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 29.
Many of the thirty nations in the region were reserving decision until the U.S. made
its position known, so the FCC/broadcast industry decision was determinative for the entire
region.
28. Public Notic~. Mimeo No. 002651, August 5, 1981, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 681. The
issue was ultimately settled within the first three days of the November 1981 AM radio conference in Rio de Janeiro; the United States, arguing that in fact the financial and technical
costs of the proposed spacing change would outweigh the benefits, joined Mexico, Canada,
Argentina, Brazil and others in support of the status quo. Consensus was forthcoming.
BROADCASTING, Nov. 9, 1981, at 38.
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tional arrangements to make use of the reserved resource, could
avoid the difficulties and delicacies of later negotiation. 29
Countries which have been allocated national DBS
assignments will assume vested interests in these orbital positions,
frequencies, powers and beam patterns. Although these orbital
assignments do not create a property interest in the assignee
state, since the geostationary orbit is in outer space and therefore
beyond sovereign appropriation, 30 they do create a resource allocation and investment expectation so great that nonconsensual use
of another state's slot would be universally sanctioned. 31 Initial
structural reservations for international DBS service will also provide the stimulus to develop the public and private institutional
arrangements necessary for the operation of an international DBS
system. Finally, such reservations will provide a more secure audience base for the development of programming specifically
29. Although rearrangement for international service might be made easier if, as
some writers have suggested, national DBS assignments are made leasable in some form,
such leasing arrangements could equally be used for national service o~ purposes. See
Levine, Orbit and Spectrum Strategies, June 1981 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 102. The
interests of cross-cultural communication would best be served by initial reservations of frequency and orbit for international DBS services, regardless of the final decision as to the
nature of rights in national assignments. See also, Regulating International Airwaves: The
1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L. L. l, 42-52, (1980), discussing market allocation and other
distributional possibilities, and A. DEVANY, R. ECKERT, c. MEYERS, D. O'HARA, & R. SCOTT,
A PROPERTY SYSTEM APPROACH TO THE ELECTRONMAGNETIC SPECTRUM (1980).
30. There is no question that outer space is beyond the sovereign claims of any state;
this is settled in article one of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
There is a question, however, (at least to a small minority of states) whether the geostationary orbit should be included in outer space. See, e.g., the Bogota Declaration, El Espectador
(Bogota, Colombia), December 7, 1976, 13A (Trans.) Declaration of the First Meeting of
Equatorial Countries, International Telecommunications Union Doc. W ARC-BS (1977) 81-E,
17 January 1977, claiming equatorial state sovereignty over the geostationary orbital arc
located above its land mass. The vast majority of states does include the geostationary orbit
as a part of nonsovereign outer space. However, there continues to be substantial disagreement as to the lower limit of outer space and the dividing line between outer and air space.
Some have argued for a spatial or physical definition of outer space and division from air
space, while others have urged a functional approach to accommodate advances of
technology. The U.S. space shuttle, which both flies and orbits, has further complicated the
question. See, e.g., Kopal, The Question of Defining Outer Space, 8 J. SPACE L. 154 (1981);
Almond, Legal Definition of Outer Space, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, IISL/IAF 77 (1978).
31. See note 17, supra. The initial investments made by users of the geostationary orbit are much larger than those made by terrestrial broadcasters. Their tacit property interests and their expectations will be concomitantly greater. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 11;
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699-701, 709 n.19 (1979).
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designed for cross-cultural education and entertainment, thus
avoiding present and future problems associated with the exportation of programming produced solely for domestic audiences.
In addition, there are many technical accommodations which
must be considered for a viable international DBS system. The
capabilities to exclude unwanted programming from the system,
to provide foreign language sidebands on DBS video signals, and
to delay broadcasts to account for time zone differentials all require technological coordination more easily accomplished in the
formative stage of DBS technology. 32
32. Technological coordination is frequently accomplished by defining the new
technology and classifying it within the existing mass communication structure. Coordination through classification has become increasingly difficult as new communication
technology has blurred traditional distinctions. For example, the Communications Act of
1934 was divided into two broad parts (common carriers and broadcasters) outlining very
different regulatory schemes for the communication technologies then existing (telegraph,
telephone, and AM radio broadcasting). The common carrier telegraph and telephone
systems were to be regulated as public utilities and were to have no control over the content of the information transmitted over their facilities. Radio broadcasters, on the other
hand, were not to be subject to profit regulation, and were to have control not only of the frequency medium, but also of the messages transmitted. The tight technological distinction
drawn in 1934 between common carriers (then only point-to-point transmitters by wire) and
broadcasters (then only multi-point transmitters over the air) has been obliterated by new
communication technologies and services.
Cable television posed the first difficult classification problem for the FCC. Coaxial
cable could perform individual services like common carriers, but could also disseminate
mass communication like a broadcaster. Although the characterization of cable television
technology as either common carrier or broadcaster (or some hybrid of the two) directly
determines the extent to which the cable operator/owner has first amendment rights, and
whether cable franchises can be issued to aliens, this question has not yet been finally decided
by either the FCC, the Supreme Court or the Cong.r ess. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979); Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in the New Technology:
The Broadcast-Cable Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 427, 497-99 (1975). DBS satellites pose
a similar classification problem for the FCC. The current fixed service satellites (FSS) are
regulated as common carriers. The Commission must determine whether DBS owners may
also program as broadcasters, or whether they are limited to providing transponder time
for hire as a common carrier. See Rice, supra note 11. The situation is further complicated
by the breakdown of differentiation between fixed service satellites and direct broadcast
satellites, a distinction incorporated into ITU rulings and spectrum allocation scheme.
Canada has announced that it is experimenting with a service capable of providing both fixed
and broadcast service from a single satellite; this development, if successful, would make
the former distinction obsolete. See LeDuc, Transforming Principles into Policy, 30/2 J.
COM. 196, 199-200 (1980).
A hybridization of radio and television services has also developed. Radio and television broadcasts, previously thought of as discrete, are now considered to be ends of a continuum of service with the spectrum space requirements bearing a direct relationship to the
number of video frames broadcast per minute. By broadcasting a single picture frame for
three minutes, with audio, the service would utilize only a radio band width, which is
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ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DBS
SERVICE

Implementation of current U.S. DBS policy would require
technological arrangements bypassing recipient state control of information links. One way in which this bypass could be accomplished would be to use domestic or otherwise unused geostationary assignments to beam into other countries. 33 To the extent
recipient states do not have advanced telecommunication technology, the opportunity for limitation of imported DBS programming would depend upon recipient state control over compatible
terrestrial receiving equipment. Future technological advances in
satellite receiving equipment, coupled with the cost reductions
due to economies of scale in mass production, will increasingly
limit the feasibility of state regulation of imported DBS signals
through control of terrestrial receiving equipment. 34
There are two technological arrangements by which to implement the Canadian-Swedish proposal, providing for the recipient
state's exercise of prior consent and right of program participation. The international DBS programming could either be broadcast by two or more domestic satellites interconnected by intersatellite service links, 35 or by a single satellite jointly controlled by
roughly 1/10,000 of a television band width. Conventional television broadcasts sixty frames
a second; the continuum covers this range. International organizations considering DBS service will have to weigh the trade-off between the number of frames per minute transmitted
by the satellite and the availability of spectrum space for additional satellites.
33. A variation of this arrangement, which would also be consistent with U.S. DBS
policy, would provide for communication with the recipient state government either by way
of notification or of consultation prior to the transborder broadcast(s). The recipient states,
however, would have no right to refuse the broadcast(s), and ultimately would be required
to abide by the decision of the exporting state. Again, to make meaningful the paramount
freedom of transborder communication would require technological arrangements bypassing recipient state checkpoints in the communication links. The underlying technological
arrangements would not differ greatly between a scheme of prior consultation/notification
and a scheme of unlimited communication rights.
34. A report of the Wroking Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites concluded: "Short
of extreme measures, there appears to be no effective long term method of preventing the
reception of unwelcome broadcasts - hence the desirability of international cooperation."
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 24 GAOR, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117
(1969).
35. The inter-satellite service link consists of:
the establishment of extremely high capacity radio communication links directly
between satellites in orbit above the earth. Thus, for example, a domestic satellite
serving U.S. customers can link up directly with a satellite serving European
customers without going through either INTELSAT or submarine facilities.
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states included within its signal contours or beam footprint. 36 In
essence, the choice is who controls the downlink of the DBS transmission - the individual state or an international organization. Individual state control of the downlink through use of domestic satRutkowski, The Inter-Satellite Service, July 1981TELECOMMUNICATIONS64 (emphasis added).
This development obviously presents some difficult and interesting questions: who would
establish or even register such service? What effect will the bypass of INTELSA T's services have on that organization, and on U.S. participation in it? Policy effects can be expected to be thoroughgoing; while emphasis to date has been on reconciling differences, implementation of inter-satellite service links would presumably necessitate the development
of some basic and universal policies. Further, the question of which domestic satellite services would be authorized to establish such links, and with whom, raises a plethora of policy
and regulation concerns. Finally, the current domestic emphasis on deregulation and competition may be pulled up short by the necessity for governmental interventions.
Though intersatellite services links would not be appropriate to all nations' uses,
those nations with developed or developing satellite broadcasting systems will surely be interested in establishing such links, and will, as a prerequisite, grapple with these and
similar concerns. "Perhaps the first petition to inaugurate the Inter-Satellite Service will
give the U.S. international telecommunications policy-making process [like the policy processes of other nations] a good test." Id.
36. If the international service is to be accomplished by use of simultaneous multiple
satellite broadcasts, bilateral relay and transmitting agreements will have to be reached, and
there would still be a net inefficiency in the systems since multiple satellites would be used
to accomplish what a single satellite could do. Id.
However, there are clearly considerations beyond purely economic concerns which
might prompt such development:
Developing countries have compelling reasons to want access to the spectrum and communications technology. In the past decade, there have been many
efforts to harness the power of communications technology for education and
social programs: to upgrade the quality of instruction, to reach preschool and outof-school children, and to teach the basic survival skills in health, nutrition, and
agriculture to adults, particularly those living in rural areas.
Hart, supra note 12, at 34. Such concerns are shared by some developed countries as wellCanada, the U.S.S.R. and Australia, for example, have significant populations in geographically isolated areas for whom radio communication is essential.
Lesser developed countries (LDCs) have additional concerns, however, which are not
reflected in developed nations, and:
[t]he urgency of the need ... cannot be overemphasized. Even in the present state
of affairs, radio has become a vital and important instrument for creating -national
confidence and national pride and for projecting abroad the national point of view.
Experience has shown that the full involvement of a people in the process of
change and growth in developing countries cannot be achieved as well through any
other means of mass communication as it can be through radio. Radio alone can
reach the remotest of villages and the humblest of homes, and persuade the citizen
to share in the vision and excitement of a country's development.
Menon, Space Communication for Developing Countries: India as an Example, in UNESCO,
COMMUNICATION IN THE SPACE AGE: THE USE OF SATELLITE BY THE MASS MEDIA 125 (1968). Of
course recognition of this need poses numerous questions of funding and of sharing of technologies which cannot be dealt with here. See, e.g., the MacBride Report, infra note 49;
Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. l, 37-42
(1980).
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ellites and inter-satellite service relays would provide recipient
states with a greater capacity to exercise the right of prior consent. Control of the downlink by an international organization
places DBS programming beyond the direct contol of the recipient
state, thus limiting a state's capacity to exclude programming to
jamming of the satellite signal. Only those states having developed telecommunications technology could jam satellite signals,
and such jamming is difficult, costly, and could entail serious degradation of domestic service. Single satellite international service,
therefore, would emphasize freedom of transborder communication at the expense of the recipient state's exercise of prior consent.
The greater the limitation upon the exercise of prior consent,
the greater will be the demand for meaningful participation in program production. For example, a bilateral arrangement for the exchange of programs via inter-satellite service links would not require deep involvement in the program production process, but
would probably involve only pre-broadcast screenings of the programming to determine whether to allow its carriage on the domestic downlink. Bilateral program exchanges are therefore more
likely to involve material produced primarily for domestic consumption but incidentally appropriate or appealing to foreign
state audiences. Recipient state concern over cultural dilution
caused by imported foreign programming produced without its involvement would be mitigated by the potential to control the
downlink distribution.
On the other hand, a multilateral arrangement to distribute
programming via a single satellite would require far greater direct involvement of states in the production process and more
complex institutional interaction. Each state must feel secure in
its opportunity to participate in the decision-making process and
must be assured that its national interest and cultural heritage
will be respected. Such an institution would require an equal
voting scheme, independent of technological differences, and a
unanimous commitment to the sharing of broadcast production and
DBS distribution technology. 37 Nothing short of these institutional
procedures and purposes will compensate the individual recipient
37. The development of this kind of agreement and commitment is without doubt
more readily achieved regionally than globally; in fact, steps have already been taken in this
direction. Probably the best example of regional communications cooperation is offered by
the European Space Agency (ESA), formerly ESRO. ESA, formed in 1975 by ten signatory
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state for its compromise of direct control over domestic downlinks. In a multilateral arrangement, it will be necessary to pronations, now includes seventeen members as well as associates and observers. Its purpose is
to provide, through international cooperation, every necessary phase of telecommunications, and with the recent successful ARIANE launches it has accomplished this. ESA cooperates fully with NASA, previously the sole source of its launches, in "non-continuous programs which have no military and little economic significance." N.M. MATTE, SPACE POLICY
AND PROGAMMES TODAY AND TOMORROW 74 (1980). ESA's recent launching of four ARIANE
satellites, and INTELSAT'S placing of an order for another launch in 1981, establishes its
capacity for independence from the American agency.
ESA has also cooperated in the joint French-West German venture Symphonie. The
1975 launch of the Symphonie satellite by NASA allows bilateral management and programming. Regional development in communications may mean anything from working out rules
of access and use, to programming, management or launching-or all of these.
Other examples of regional development exist. The Commonwealth Telecommunications Board, established in 1928, invited membership of Nigeria, Ghana and Malaya in 1961;
many of the newly-independent African states have subsequently joined as well. This
cooperation, coupled with the collaboration of ITU, the Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA) and Organization for African Unity (OAU), has resulted in the formation of the PanAfrican Telecommunications Organization (PANAFTEL), which includes 38 member states
and is developing regional satellite communications plans. ARABSAT, a consortium of 21
Arab states, is actively engaged in satellite telecommunications, and is presently contracting with ARIANE for launching and satellites and with the United States for telemetry.
P ALAP A is the regional communications entity of Indonesia and the South Asian islands;
Intersputnik's MOLYNIYA 2 is intended to link Eastern Europe, Cuba, Mongolia and the
U.S.S.R. by satellite; and NORDSAT, the five-member Scandinavian entity, has cooperated
in programming and management for years. In addition, the European Broadcasting Union, a
non-governmental, non-administrative coordinating organization, provides an example of
the cooperation and collaboration requisite to communications regional development.
Regional development is desirable not only because it is more practicable than global
efforts are likely to be, but also because it offers greater accountability of its members. International law in general, and international organizations in particular, offer little in the
way of enforcement; this is not the case with regional organizations.
A regional tribunal could take prompt action to notify the manager of a satellite to
disqualify a violating originator from continued use of the system. And where a
state violated a regional plan through aggressive broadcasting by its own broadcasdng system, sanctions could be taken against the state itself. These might include modification of the satellite beam to exclude coverage of the bulk of that nation's receiving sets.
Price, First Amendment Constraints and the Direct Broadcast Satellite Controversy, in
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES:
POLICIES AND PROBLEMS 35, 80 (1975). For further discussions of regional developments in
communication, see MATTE, supra; Wigand, The Direct Satellite Connection: Definitions
and Prospects, 30/2 J. COM. 140 (1980); Dickinson, Telecommunications Satellites and the
European Broadcasting Union, in UNESCO, COMMUNICATION IN THE SPACE AGE 101 (1968);
Elias, The Contribution of Telecommunications and Direct Satellite Broadcasting to
Technical Assistance and Nation-Building in the "New" Countries: An African Viewpoint,
in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATION 122 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971). Although hopes
have been expressed in ITU conferences, the U.N. General Assembly, and elsewhere that
global communications might be possible, the ongoing debates in UNESCO, the declarations
made in Bogota and Talloires, and continuing discussions in other forums clearly
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gram expressly for the international, cross-cultural audiences to
be served. 38
The technological arrangements necessary to implement the
U .S.S.R. policy of an absolute sovereign right of every state to exclude unwanted broadcast programming would require a degree of
international cooperation and consensus well beyond that required
by the above schemes. Assurance of the sovereign right of prior
consent could be achieved only by an international enforcement
agency with the authority and capability to terminate the satellite
source or intercept its signal, or by providing each and every state
with the technological capacity to block offending programming. 39
The former alternative would require a detailed code and a complex adjudicatory process whereby a state's plea for international
agency protection against offending exporting countries could be
judged. The latter alternative would require a rapid equalization
of technological capacity beyond any reasonable possibility. 40
demonstrate the difficulties involved in reaching world-wide agreement. Future
developments and technologies may stimulate world-wide policy formation, but for the time
being it is important to realize DBS's potential as fully as possible through its application in
regional systems.
38. Although, as discussed below, the multilateral scheme could accommodate
domestic production of programming by public and private entities for international consumption, these programs would, from conception through production, be designed for
cross-cultural audiences.
39. The termination or interception of offensive signals would be an arguably military
response to freely broadcast programming, and is an outgrowth of the U.S.S .R.'s insistence
that unwanted broadcasts are as surely a violation of national sovereignty as is a physical
invasion. See U.S.S.R. Working Papers, supra note 6. The suggestion of forming an international enforcement agency runs counter to the entire experience and history of international
law and is, to understate, very unlikely. The closest modern history has come to such an enforcement agency is the use of United Nations military security forces pursuant to the U.N.
Charter articles 42-47; such use has rarely been invoked, and then has often been held to be
ineffective. The thought of a strict code enforced by an international agency is antithetical
to the policies of negotiation and consensus which underlie international law.
40. Equalizing the distribution of telecommunication technology and program production capacity is also an important element of any arrangement built upon the SwedishCanadian proposal, but that scheme does not depend upon such a rapid and exact parity for
operational viability. The assumptions one is prepared to make regarding technological development can obviously play a determinative role in establishing one's point of view regarding implemention of one or another of these schemes.
Although some question the operational and economic viability of DBS service, see
Doyle, International Satellite Communications and the New Information Order: Distressing Broadcasting Satellites, 8 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 365 (1981), history suggests that if
one is to err in planning for new telecommunication services, the error should be on the side
of more, rather than less, technological advancement. The development of the burgeoning
field of informatics is a case in point. Informatics, roughly definable as the commingling of
computer and communication technologies, is defined and introduced in the MacBride
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PUBLIC AND/OR PRIVATE LICENSES FOR
INTERNATIONAL DBS ASSIGNMENTS

International DBS assignments could be awarded to and
operated by public entities, private entities, or both. Under the
public model, rights in the license would be held by a consortium
of states. Programming and operation of the service would be delegated to a subsidiary of the consortium. Although some programming might be produced by this subsidiary, the subsidiary would
more likely serve as a network feed of programming produced by
Report, infra note 49, at 64-67. This field of endeavor, virtually non-existent a decade ago,
calls forth variations of the same problems and concerns as have become familiar in other
communications fields, e.g., DBS and remote sensing; economic, social and political issues
are involved, and the paramount concern is the balancing of national insistence pn
sovereignty and privacy with the desire for free exchange of information and ideas. In addition, the economic concerns regarding production and market development, voiced in other
contexts primarily by LDCs, are in the context of informatics taken up by others: "The
European nations' concern is economic, and their regulations have an ambivalent theme:
both preserving privacy and reducing America's technological and business presence
abroad." Olenick, Transnational Data Flow: Data Protection or Economic Protectionism?,
in THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER 21, 23 (1979).
. The sovereignty concerns are of a different nature in the field of transborder data flow
(TDF) than in DBS, as they center on infringements of privacy and on dependence on (particularly, but not solely) the United States, rather than primarily on cultural "invasion".
These concerns are nonetheless acute: "Information is power, and economic information is
economic power .... [T]he ability to store and process certain types of data may well give
one country political and technological advantages over other countries. This in turn leads
to a loss of national sovereignty through supranational data flows." Louis Joinet, SecretaryGeneral of French Commission on Data Processing and Liberties, quoted in Pipe, National
Policies, International Debates, 29 J. CoM. 115, 118 (1979). Not only may sovereignty be
diminished through this process; its very nature and definition are modified. See, Gotlieb,
Dalfen & Katz, The Transborder Transfer of Information by Communications and Computer Systems: Issues and Approaches to Guiding Principles, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 229
(1974).
In addition, the development of national systems of infomatics is seen as indispensable
for other reasons: "The flow of technical information within nations and across national
boundaries is a major resource for development. Access to such information, which countries need for technical decision-making at all levels, is as crucial as access to news sources."
MacBride Report, infra note 49, at 260. Beyond the fear of not having access to necessary information, some nations also fear "that they will be unable to participate in the world
political and economic community" unless they develop their own national infomatics
schemes. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW:
FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 96-1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT 1535).
Such attitudes and concerns have, not surprisingly, resulted in the creation of significant barriers to international information flow. Whether the problems of free TDF are seen
as primarily trade-related in nature or less tangible:._ dealing with, for · example, national
sovereignty, personal privacy, a clash of international institutions, or cultural imperialism-the result is an effective stopping of the flow, with resultant loss of information
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domestic affiliated stations expressly for international consumption. Decisions regarding which programs would or would not be
carried by a public DBS service would be made by an equal voting
process, in which each domestic affiliated station or state opted
for the programming most appealing and appropriate to its audience. By this process, programming proposals having the broadest cross-cultural appeal would be funded, w bile programming
proposals of interest to or appropriate for only narrow audiences
would not.' 1
exchange, of trade, and of efficiency. REPORT 1535 supra, at 13, 25. Barriers may take
various forms, from the imposition of tariffs to an absolute prohibition of non-domestic services. Id. at 13. In addition, PTT anti-competitive policies and the threat of nationalization of
facilities by LDC hosts discourage private investment and development.
The need for international agreement is clear. Preliminary efforts have been made by
the Council of Europe (CE) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but both are limited-membership, non-representative organizations as far as
various positions on TDF are concerned. The U.N. is an inappropriate forum because of its
already crowded agenda and the practical impossibility of active participation by all interested parties; the ITU has become too politicized to deal effectively with the intricacies
of TDF. A partial answer may be the proposed formation of a consortium of LDCs, Eger,
Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy Protection on Non-Tariff
Trade Barriers? 10 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1055, 1090 (1978), but surely the development of an
international organization whose convention would dovetail with, or take precedence over,
domestic laws is desirable and necessary.
Parallel to the requirement for central government policies concerning computer data bases is an increasing need for supra-national regulations governing the
import and export of electronically transmitted data. Such codes of regulations incorporate technical standards including compatibility of systems, confidentiality
and security of data stored and transmitted, and some normative dimensions as to
the propriety of holding various sensitive information on individuals.
Pipes, Data Base Development and International Dimension, in ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) Doc. DAS/SPR/72-20 at 143. In addition
to the guidelines discussed above, these international regulations would have to deal with
the question of access by the subject individual or entity to information about himself or
itself. See Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, supra, at 253-4. It might reasonably be assumed that a
comprehensive international agreement would, while imposing relatively stringent
guidelines, serve to stimulate TDF; Olenick, supra at 31.
Informatics can be seen, then, as another forum demanding resolution of the tension,
inherent in international telecommunications, "between the conflicting state interests in
protecting, conserving, and controlling information on the one hand, and of importing, exporting and exchanging ideas on the other- both in pursuit of state goals and in support of
national policies." Gotlieb, Dalfen and Katz, supra, at 227. See also, OECD, GUIDELINES ON
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACIES AND TRANSBORDER BORDER DATA FLOWS (1981).
41. This kind of "popularity poll" programming raises the problem of lowest-commondenominator programming, already discussed in note 19 supra, and the fear that, in trying
to appeal to everyone, the programming will be identifiable with no one.
The public broadcasting system in the U.S. is an example of the application of this
theory. Though funded 50% with federal money, according to the Public Broadcasting Act
of 1967, it is a non-governmental, non-political entity meant to encourage excellence and
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Equal voting, however, is only one condition necessary for the
operation of a public DBS system. Of equal importance is equality
of opportunity in programming production among the affiliated domestic entities. 42 This would require financial and technological
assistance in building modern studio facilities in countries without
such facilities, and in training persons in film and video technique.
The financial assistance could come from public subsidies apportioned among the affiliated states on a progressive basis. 43 Techdiversity through the development of "noncommercial education broadcast stations ... on a
local, state, regional, and national basis." Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. §396(g)(2)(G)
(1976). The public system is designed to meet discrete and minority needs and interests;
because of its public funding, it has a special duty to do so. Its "obligation includes not merely
service to the general public but also service to significant, distinctive minority interests
which are not and cannot be as fully served by commercial stations." Alabama Educational
Television Commission, 50 F.C.C.2d 461, 472 (1975). Because of the system's need to garner
popular support to achieve the remainder of its funding without abandoning its noncommercial status as federal spending on PBS is increasingly restricted, it has had to increase its
appeal for private donations. These donations are obviously made on the basis of approval of
programming; as a result, the system which was designed to respond to minority needs has
been accused by some of being a government subsidy of the upper middle class. See further
discussion at note 113, infra. Programming on PBS "should address itself to the ideal of excellence, not the idea of acceptability .... Once in a while it does, and you get a quick glimpse of its potential." Letter from E.B. White to the Carnegie Commission, quoted in D.
GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOWARDS RADIO, TELEVISION AND
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 635 (1979). See generally A PUBLIC TRUST: THE REPORT OF THE
CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING (1979).
On the other hand, national network television has been credited by some as a unifier,
via provision of a common base-line of experience, of the diverse and separated cultures
within the U.S.; international direct broadcasting could serve a similar function, and offer
unparalleled opportunities for increased cross-cultural understanding and sharing. See note
48, infra.
42. The question of equal opportunity in domestic law has spawned various interpretations: Does equal opportunity mean simply refraining from erecting barriers to accomplishment, or does it involve a more active response in the form of remediation of those
formerly deprived? In civil rights law, at least, equality of result rather than simply of opportunity has become the aim. This interpretation involves greater individual and social
costs, but is more likely to bring about the needed changes.
43. A tension exists in international public organizations between inequality of investment or contribution and equality of voting or control. Organizations concerned directly
with finance and credit, such as the International Monetary Fund, are operated on weighted
voting schemes reflecting the disproportionate investment of member states. Organizations
concerned with ministerial functions, such as the ITU, have adopted equal voting schemes
without regard to size or state of technological development. U.S. participation in an international DBS consortium would not be for a direct, immediately measurable return on
capital. Rather the benefits to the U.S. would come from longer term expansion of new
markets and from a more open exchange of ideas throughout the world. See, e.g., Christo},
The International Telecommunications Union and the International Law of Outer Space, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, IISL/IAF 35
(1979); Snow, INTELSAT: An International Example, 30 J. COM. 147 (1980).

Published by SURFACE, 1981

21

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1981], Art. 2

286

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 8:265

nological assistance could come through the open sharing within
the consortium of know-how and experience. The training could be
accomplished either through establishment of international universities for the study of telecommunications, or through scholarship programs in which students could attend universities in those
countries having telecommunications specialities. 44
The private model would require establishment of an international authority and development of general standards and procedures for comparing competing applicants and evaluating license
renewals. At a minimum, these standards would look to the programming proposed and/or presented by each applicant, the applicant's familiarity with the audience, and the applicant's ownership
composition. Applicants proposing quality programming of demonstrated cross-cultural appeal, who sought to learn about the
peoples served and to respond to their needs, would be preferred.
Similarly, applicants having an ownership structure reflective of
the countries served, and employing citizens of these countries in
management and staff positions, would also be preferred, as they
would be more likely to provide satisfactory service thap applicants owned and operated by corporations and citizens of any
one country. 45 The procedure adopted by an international licensing
A similar conflict of interests arose within INTELSAT between owners and users of
the INTELSAT system. States having an ownership interest in excess of their percentage
usage of the system tended to favor higher rates of return on their investment. States using
the system to a greater extent than was reflected in their proportionate ownership tended
to favor lower usage rates and lower rates of return on their investments. This conflict has
been resolved by periodic adjustments of the permissible ownership allotments to reflect
percentage changes in the use of the INTELSAT system. Colino, International Cooperation
Between Communications Satellite Systems: An Overview of Current Practices and
Future Prospects, 5 J. SPACE L. 65, 92 (1977).
44. Although it is difficult to predict precisely the programming such a public DBS
system would yield, or to anticipate the quality and creativity these opportunities might
unleash, some speculation about the general types of programming which would be provided
is possible. The programming should avoid propagandizing; when a politically slanted statement or presentation is made, opportunity should be given to present other views as well.
(The New World Information Order's "balanced flow" insists on this, as does the U.S.
fairness doctrine). The programming should not, directly or indirectly, attempt to persuade
anyone of the rightness or wrongness of given political principles; rather, it should make
available quantities of information from many and diverse sources, allowing recipients to
learn and to make informed choices. The programming should seek to educate people about
the places and people around them, and about the commonality of human experience. News
events, sports, films, national festivals and celebrations, concerts, plays, natural and social
science research, and travel/adventure logs seem likely prospects for international DBS programming.
45. The FCC's license evaluation and ascertainment processes are reflected in these
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authority should afford every applicant a full and fair consideration of its application and an opportunity to present firsthand the
merits of its proposed programming or past service. 46 These procedures should also afford representatives of the international audience the opportunity for input into the licensing process. 47
A hybrid model would include both public and private DBS
systems, and would make possible the realization of the inherent
advantages of each. 48
remarks. "Ascertainment" refers to the licensee's duty to ascertain the needs of the service
population, and to respond to them. See note 104, infra and accompanying text. Local
ownership structure, reflective of the service area, and integration of ownership and
management have been a controlling factor in FCC licensing proceedings. See notes 139 and
140, infra. These guidelines are established in the name of the Communications Act's mandate of service for the public interest, convenience and necessity.
46. See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). Cf. Policy Statement
Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424
(1970), rev'd sub nom. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir.
1971). In an effort to expedite the licensing process, Congress has recently authorized the
Commission to employ a random selection process, but one which will ensure that groups
which are now insufficiently represented in ownership of broadcast facilities will be given
significant preferences. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35
§1242(3)(A), 95 Stat. 736-37 (1981). It remains to be seen whether a random system will
simplify licensing.
47. Domestically, audience members have standing to participate in the licensing
process; this was firmly established in United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), where then Circuit Judge Burger wrote:
Since the concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a
proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude those with such an obvious and acute
concern as the listening audience. This much seems essential to insure that the
holders of broadcating licenses be responsive to the needs of the audience, without
which the broadcaster could not exist.
Id. at 1002. Judge Burger chided the broadcast industry for failing to grasp, even after fifty
years of operation, "the simple fact that a broadcast license is a public trust subject totermination for breach of duty," id. at 1003, and says that the Commission can avoid the "clogging" of its dockets by a "host of parties" through efficient administration and application of
guidelines.
The need sought to be met is to provide a means for reflection of listener appraisal of a licensee's performance as the performance .meets or fails to meet the
licensee's statutory obligation to operate the facility in the public interest ....
[I]ntervention on behalf of the public is not allowed to press private interests but
only to vindicate the broad public interest relating to a licensee's performance of
the public trust inherent in every license.
Id. at 1006.
48. Private commercial systems afford the advantages of costless service and greater
independence from government, but most appeal to broad, homogeneous cross-sections of
the society to be financially viable. Public systems, not dependent upon mass appeal for
revenue, afford the advantages of greater program selectivity and diversity, but at the risk
of domination by the government or by interest groups influential in the government. See
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PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION AFFECTING U.S.
DBS POLICY

U.S. satellite and television program production technology
are unrivaled. The U.S. is today the largest exporter of satellite
equipment and broadcast programming in the world. 49 Few nations
have satellite technology, and many have only rudimentary terrestrial telephone and/or broadcast systems. 5° Clearly, the U.S. would
enjoy a wide advantage in the free flow of transborder communication by DBS were an open skies access scheme now adopted.
However, this advantage may come at the sacrifice of other U.S.
interests at home and abroad. It must be remembered that although few nations today have satellite technology, those industrialized countries which do are making rapid advances in
research and development and may soon rival the U.S. for the satellite export market. Industrialized countries are already competitive with the U.S. in the export of broadcast production technology and are gaining in the export of broadcast program
material. 51
If it is in the best economic interest of the U.S. to expand export markets for DBS technology and related production equipment, the U.S. must ask whether such market expansion will more
note 41, supra. Public systems must also maintain a far greater degree of political neutrality
than private systems.
Some are skeptical as to whether a sufficiently viable economic base exists to warrant
private investment in international DBS programming; see remarks of Harry Olsson
reported in Friendly, The Control of Program Content in International Telecommunications: A Discussion of General Principles, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L . 40, 61 (1974). Reservation of international DBS assignments would greatly increase economic viability for
private investment. See text accompanying note 31, supra. Mass audiences have an inherent
commercial value to mass producers of goods and services. Each generation of new mass
telecommunication technology in the U.S. has resulted in new marketing opportunities.
Tourism, air transportation, banking and investment industries may find international DBS
audiences especially attractive.
49. UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD: COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY TODAY AND TOMORROW,
108-09 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MACBRIDE REPORT].
50. Id. at 123-34.
51. In satellite technology, Japan, West Germany, France and the Netherlands are
producing sophisticated equipment and can successfully compete with the U.S. in a world
market. In programming, Britain and Canada have developed export systems, and regional
groups such as NORDSAT develop their own programming which, it might be expected,
may be exported in the future. If film production is a valid indicator, the U.S. can expect
heavy competition from Italy, France, Britain, India and the U.S.S.R., as well as others. See
generally BROADCASTING YEARBOOK (1980-1981).
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likely occur through cooperation with an international DBS organization or through unilateral U.S. action. The U.S. must also consider whether developing countries entering the DBS market will
purchase from the U.S. if the U.S. pursues a policy of unilateralism, or whether they will turn to industrialized countries which
are cooperating in international institutional arrangements and
have thus embraced DBS policy positions more closely in line with
their own.
U.S. leadership in the development of international fixed
satellite service (FSS) through its investment in and assistance to
INTELSAT provides a remarkable contrast to its stance on DBS. 52
52. INTELSAT was established in 1964 by the eleven nations signing the Agreement
Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite
System, Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.l.A.S. No. 5646. Open to all ITU members (presently 154 nations), INTELSAT currently consists of 106 member states. INTELSAT is
organized in two segments: the space segment, including satellites, telemetry, and so on,
owned and operated by the international consortium itself; and the ground segment, consisting of earth stations individually owned and operated by the telecommunications entities of the nations in which they are located. See the COMSAT Study, 77 F.C.C.2d 564,
589-90 (1980).
Although it has been criticized as non-universal (since it includes, for example, none
of the Soviet bloc countries) and as overly westernized, and weighted to remain so, see
Kopal, East-West Cooperation in Space Telecommunications: A Socialist Countries' Viewpoint [sic] in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 99, 102-03 (E. McWhinney ed.
1971), INTELSAT is interesting in several regards. Voting was originally based on investment shares, and has recently been modified to reflect utilization of services as well.
Futhermore, INTELSAT regulates itself, unlike U.S. domestic communications entities,
which are subject to federal regulation. Finally, while INTELSAT is similar to other international organizations in that it is composed of governmental representatives and uses a
treaty or agreement as the basis of its self-regulation, it is completely unlike others in that
it "is the only such organization that involves the operation of an enterprise along commercial lines." Snow, supra note 43, at 149. Each member is not only an owner, but also a user.
INTELSAT's commercial basis posits many interesting questions and concerns; for one
thing, commercial operation clearly precludes the provision of services to LDC gratis or at
reduced rates, since such a decision would be justifiable only on a political, not a profitmaking, basis. INTELSA T's primary goal is "efficient provision, technologically and
economically, of world-wide satellite communications." Id. at 155. "[T]he United States took
the initiative in laying the institutional groundwork for an organization to provide ... public
telecommunications by satellite between the United States and other countries." Id. at 148.
When INTELSAT was formed in 1964, see note 43, supra, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were
the only nations with satellite communications potential; for political reasons the two did
not communicate. The U.S., in helping to form INTELSAT, contributed technological expertise as well as more than half of the initial investment costs. Id.
U.S. dominance of INTELSAT in these early stages was unassailable: "Space segment
procurement was from United States manufacturing concerns and launch services were
from NASA." COMSAT Study, supra, at 591. U.S. ownership (53%) and management of INTELSAT were determinative of the latter's early development; the U.S. representative to
INTELSAT, COMSAT, retained its position as Manager of INTELSAT for the first nine
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U.S. policy on FSS has consistently emphasized international cooperation; the result has been rapid development of efficient international FSS service at decreasing cost. The extent to which U.S.
policy on FSS has led to an expansion of the FSS export market
and has enabled the U.S. to acquire a major share of this market
must be considered in the formulation of U.S. DBS policy. U.S. unilateralism with respect to DBS service could result in a stultification of international development and loss of U.S. export opportunities.53
The U.S. free flow policy may also disserve domestic economic interests in a stable DBS industry and pose costly and troublesome administrative problems. Many applications have been submitted to the FCC for authority to provide domestic DBS broadcast service. 54 The FCC, in reviewing these applications, must
carefully consider the economic impact upon the national broadcast networks, local affiliate stations, program producers and distributors, and of course, the American public. After reaching a
decision on the structure of the domestic DBS industry (a process
that may take many years and involve complex cost-benefit analyyears of the organization, and accordingly shaped INTELSA T's policies and practices to a
great degree. Throughout this period of early development, U.S. policy consistently emphasized and encouraged technological growth and expansion of services. Though the U.S.
role has diminished considerably, in accession to the 1973 final agreements of INTELSAT,
its emphasis on cooperation and development continues. Snow, supra, note 43, at 148.
INTELSAT's extraordinary progress in the field of telecommunications
satellites in recent years, combining high scientific advances with unexpectedly
low financial costs, has been largely the product of United States technological and
managerial skill. Without this distinctively American contribution it would be
hardly possible to talk seriously today about achieving a global system to telecommunications satellites.
McWhinney, The Development of an International Law of Communications, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 11, 14 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971).
53. See generally McWhinney, supra note 52; Chayes, Unilateralism in U.S. Satellite
Communications Policy, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 42 (E. McWhinney
ed. 1971).
54. See Inquiry into the Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Interim
Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,124 (1981). Among the fourteen parties
with applications on file are several seeking to provide free or pay television directly to the
home (for example, COMSAT's Satellite Television Corporation (STC)), several proposing to
feed satellite signals to television stations for broadcast into the home (for example, Hubbard Broadcasting's United States Satellite Broadcasting Company), and a few offering to provide high resolution television services (for example, CBS), BROADCASTING, July 6, 1981at11.
The varied service sought to be provided by DBS operators will further complicate the
problem of classifying DBS technology within the established communication system. See
discussion at note 32, supra.
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sis and careful balancing of social and economic interests), could
the FCC then ignore a foreign satellite service blanketing the
U.S.? The spector of pirate satellites, broadcasting without regard
to consequences to domestic media, may become as threatening to
the U.S. as it now is to other countries. 55 As DBS technology
spreads among the nations of the world (which it is likely to do at a
much more rapid pace than has been the case for other technologies), it will become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to abide its
free flow policy.
55. The problem of pirate radio broadcasts has plagued several nations over the past
half century. Pirate broadcasts are unsolicited, undesirable, and apparently invulnerable to
attempts at regulation or termination. "The pirate broadcaster is one who transmits into
the territory of a nation from beyond that nation's territorial boundaries and without its
authorization." Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 770 (1968). (One wonders
whether this definition necessarily includes broadcasts proposed under the U.S. free flow
policy).
Pirate broadcasts are objectionable for several reasons: they often subvert domestic
broadcast policy (e.g., against advertising); they may interfere with established spectrum
allocation for other AM or FM radio uses and marine or emergency bands; they may cause
economic harm to domestic broadcasters; they may pose problems of tax evasion and copyright infringement; they may create undesirable commercial pressures in the target country; and finally, pirate broadcasts may be morally and/or culturally offensive or objectionable. "At stake is more than a system of national communication, because broadcasting
also has the vitally important task of identifying and strengthening cultural entities,
regional entities and community loyalties." Canadian Radio Television Commission, Intergration of Cable Television in tke Canadian Broadcast System (1971).
The United Kingdom is among those nations targeted; the unregistered ship Caroline
has broadcast from international waters off the English coast more or less continuously
since the 1930s, and continues to do so today, BROADCASTING, Sept. 1981, despite passage
and enforcement of the Act to Suppress Broadcasting from Ships or Aircraft and Certain
Marine Structures (Marine Offences Act of 1967). France has also faced unwelcome broadcasting from Radio Europe I, owned by Frenchmen and broadcasting from the German Saar
region.
Various efforts have been made, domestically (as stated above) and internationally, to
eliminate this problem: the ITU's Radio Regulations art. 7, no. 28 ,1 prohibits pirate broadcasting; the Council of Europe has classified such activities as illegal, as have the Administrative Council of the European Broadcasting Union and the International Broadcasting Union. The major problems center on questions of jurisdiction-especially if the
broadcasts are initiated on the high seas-and enforcement. Neither question has been settled by international law, though the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10, the
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone have all been brought into consideration. In addition, customary international law, at least according to some sources, allows any nation to assert jurisdiction
over one in flagrant violation of international law.
No real resolution, and no practicable solution, has yet been reached on the question
of broadcast piracy. It may be assumed, however, that as direct broadcasting from satellites
becomes the norm, piracy will be more and more broadly practiced, and the need for resolution more pressing. See generally, Smith, supra; Hunnings, Pirate Broadcasting in European Waters, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 410 (1965); Price, supra note 37, at 44-48.
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U.S. exportation of DBS broadcast programming also poses
practical problems. It is doubtful whether a U.S. free flow policy
would be construed to allow international DBS broadcasters operating from within the U.S. to go unregulated, unlike their domestic counterparts. More likely would be the use of some type of
licensing scheme, along the lines of current domestic practice. If a
DBS broadcaster must obtain an FCC license to transmit internationally, how is the licensee's performance during the license term
to be judged? Would the FCC refuse to consider programming exported to foreign audiences? If foreign programming services
were unilaterally reviewed, what standards should the Commission apply? And should foreign citizens receiving exported U.S.
programming have the same standing to contest DBS license renewals as U.S. citizens have to contest terrestrial license renewals? 56
Finally, the U.S. free flow policy may entail political costs and
may disserve U.S. foreign relations. Developing nations forced to
choose between U.S. and U.S.S.R. policy leads on DBS may be
pressed to accept code restrictions as a protection against the
threat of foreign DBS programming. In its present form, the proposed U.S.S.R. code applies to all DBS transmissions, including national as well as international ~ervice. In addition, the definition
of DBS service adopted by the ITU includes both transmission direct to homes and transmission to community reception points for
terrestrial relay to homes. 58 Should the present code proposal be
adopted, arguably it would apply to purely domestic DBS service
and to terrestrial communication links. Such an argument could be
used to legitimize outside control of or influence upon domestic
communication policy through economic and political coercion. 59
57

56. See discussion of standing, supra note 47. In practice, therefore, U.S. free flow
policy would argue for the unfettered freedom to communicate, internationally, programming which is subject to domestic regulatory review. This contradiction would be directly
attributable to the inconsistency between U.S. domestic and international communications
policies. See remarks of Abram Chayes reprinted in Friendly, The Control of Program Content, supra note 48, at 40-67.
57. The U.S.S.R. proposal seeks to "elaborate principles governing the use by states
of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting with a view to concluding an
international agreement," U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117, Annex III (1972), without distinguishing
national from international broadcasting.
58. 1976 Edition, Radio Regulations, vol. 1, ITU, Geneva. DBS is defined as a satellite
transmitter of "signals [which] are intended for direct reception by the general public."
"Direct reception" is then defined as including both "individual reception" and "community
reception."
59. An attempt by one state, through military, economic and/or political coercion, to
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Just as U.S. insistence upon the absolute right of communication
may result in less international communication, the U .S.S.R. insistence upon the absolute right of sovereign prior consent could
result in reduced sovereign control of domestic communication.
The U.S. free flow position further exacerbates the plight of
developing nations by failing to provide policy alternatives more
consistent with their present needs and social and cultural traditions. Many developing nations may well be unwilling or unable to
adopt a free flow policy domestically. Should these developing
countries seek some consistency between their international and
domestic communication policies, and should they be forced to
choose between free flow and code restrictions, they might opt for
a code for lack of a more suitable model.
Politically, the critical question is not how much communication freedom ought ideally to be protected, but how much can be
protected in light of popular intolerance. For mass communication,
domestic or international, to exist there must be popularly accepted limitations upon the right to communicate. 60 The failure to
appreciate these political realities in the formulation of U.S. DBS
policy could cost the U.S. its leadership position in advancing open
communication policies throughout the world.

VIL CONSIDERATION OF U.S. DBS POLICY IN
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXTS
Although detailed international agreements and fully developed institutional arrangements are not preconditions to the resdetermine communication policies of another state should be of major concern to the U.S.
Any agreement by the U.S. to a prior consent principle for satellite television broadcasting
should be sharply distinguished from U.S. policy against interference by one state in the
communication affairs of another, a violation of international law and national sovereignty
which is forbidden in the U.N. Charter, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 4, 7, and indeed by jus
cogens. A principal basis of the prior consent principle is the state's sovereign right to control information flowing within its borders. Although agreement by the U.S. to a prior consent principle would imply affirmation of the independent right of every state to determine
for itself its internal and international communication policies, on an issue of this
magnitude, the U.S. should seek to avoid misunderstandings through adoption of express
clarifying language. As part of a prior consent convention, such language could strongly affirm the svvereign right of every state to determine freely its telecommunication policy
without coercion by any other state. Such clarifying language might not have much practical
effect on states already subject to foreign control of, or influence upon, their communication
channels, but it could well focus attention on the critical distinction between prior consent
and state communication sovereignty.
60. See Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949). Professor Chafee, defending the clear and present danger test then used by the S~preme Court, suggested that the
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ervation of international DBS assignments, such reservations depend, preliminarily, on the prospect of some minimal accomodation
of policy among the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Until
common principles are recognized among states in the Americas,
international structural reservations and the benefits of the full
communication potential of DBS technology cannot be realized. If
such accommodation is to be achieved, the U.S. must inevitably
play a major role.
The U.S., however, has deep misgivings regarding modification of its international free flow position. There is, first, concern
that modification of the absolute right to receive and transmit information regardless of means and frontiers might be perceived,
or publicized, as a compromise by the U.S. of its general human
rights principles. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 61 secures for every person the right to obtain information and to form opinions freely. No nation has more aggressively
advanced the individual's right to know, domestically and internationally, than the U.S. The fear is that should the U.S. cooperate
with some international institution having the powers of programming review and sanctions -an institution likely to include nations
not having communication freedom 62 -this cooperation might be
interpreted as endorsing or acquiescing to government control
and censorship. Can U.S. international communications policy
draw a principled distinction between participation in DBS program controls and commitment to the individual right to obtain
and impart information?
The corollary of the individual right to obtain and impart inpursuit of an absolute immunity for public discussion might result in popular pressure for
legislation and, ultimately, no immunity. A similar phenomenon could occur internationally.
61. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948) states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
See also, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975 [Helsinki Accord], reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1292, 1315 (1975). Cf., International Telecommunication Convention, Dec. 22,
1952, arts. 29, 30, 6 U.S.T. 1213, T.l.A.S. No. 3266, establishing the right of a state to halt
transmission of a private telegram, or to suspend indefinitely any international telecommunication service, which appears dangerous to security or public decency.
62. A recent world press survey indicated t!tat less than one quarter of the nations of
the world have a "free press". MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 19.
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formation is the individual right to privacy, and the right to be
free from unwanted communications. If this right can be realized
only through the mechanism of government, 63 the antagonism between content controls and human rights breaks down; the issue
then is cast not in terms of the right of government to control information coming within its borders, but rather in terms of the
right of the individual to be free from unwanted communication intrusion. Such a right of privacy has been recognized in U.S. broadcast law in a number of contexts, with courts relying upon the ubiquitous nature of radio and television programming and its entry
into the home to support restrictions on programming content. 64 In
a recent case dealing with the broadcast of indecent language, 65
the Supreme Court likened the broadcast material to a "nuisance,"
subject to regulation like air pollution, and strongly affirmed the
individual right to be free of obnoxious and offensive broadcasts.
If this personal privacy right established in domestic communication law is to be recognized in international policy, the U.S. must
agree to some controls upon the flow of transborder communication. U.S. policy on international DBS broadcasting should respect
personal privacy rights, as well as advance the principle of
freedom of communication. 66
63. American communications law evidences a belief that this is true; cases have affirmed the authority, and even the duty, of the legislative and administrative bodies to intervene to safeguard personal privacy. The argument that listeners and viewers can turn
off their receiving sets to void unwanted and obnoxious communications coming into their
homes has not proven persuasive. See discussion at note 74, infra.
64. See, e.g., Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Notice to Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 57 F.C.C.2d 783 (1975); Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964); KFKB Broadcasting
Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
65. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
66. The Supreme Court has also upheld against first amendment attack the use of zoning ordinances to regulate the places at which sexually explicit magazines, books and
movies can be distributed. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), The Supreme
Court established guidelines on government restrictions which infringe upon first amendment rights. In 0 'Brien, the Court said such restrictions were permissible if (i) the regulation lay within the constitutional power of the government and furthered a substantial
government interest, (ii) that interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
and (iii) the restriction of free expression was no greater than was necessary to promote the
government interest. 391 U.S. at 377.
In a 5-4 decision the court held in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976), that restrictive zoning of adult bookstores did not violate first amendment freedoms
so long as the restricting ordinance defined clearly what characteristics were to be considered and so long as alternative access to the market remained available. The government's concern for the public health and safety, Bayou Landing, Ltd. v. Watts, 563 F.2d
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The U.S. is also concerned that acquiescence to proposed controls on DBS not compromise international press freedom. U.S.
DBS policy has been influenced by developments affecting other
international communications media. UNESCO's consideration of
licensing news journalists 67 and of monitoring news and wire service for balance and distortion 68 has met with strong resistance in
the U.S. 69 as well as in other nations committed to a free and
pluralistic exchange of expression. 70 Taken in the context of the
U.S. record on past matters of the UNESCO agenda, the U.S. is
understandably apprehensive that any compromise of the free
flow principles on DBS might weaken its position of resistance to
controls on .other communication media. 71
Participation by the U.S. in an agency responsible for internationally broadcast satellite programming, however, can be disting1172 (5th Cir. 1977), and its paramount interest in protecting, preserving and improving the
character and quality of residential neighborhoods, Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978), justify such zoning. These restrictions, within these
guidelines, are not an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. See Metropolitan
Board of Zoning Appeals v. Zaphiriou, __ Ind. App. __, 376 N.E. 2d 110 (1978).
67. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1978, at A12, col. 5.
68. The proposal finds its basis in UNESCO's General Conference Declaration of Mass
Media (Nov. 22, 1978). Article X states: "2. It is important that free flow and wider and better
balanced dissemination of information be encouraged." Both the licensing of journalists and
the monitoring of news services are discussed in the MacBride Report, note 49 supra, and
are supported by many of the proponents of a New World Information Order.
69. U.S. response has been uniformly and strongly negative. It has taken the form of
threats of withdrawal from UNESCO (mentioned though not endorsed by Assistant
Secretary of State Elliott Abrams) and of a House Resolution, R.R. Res. 142, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H2316 (1981), calling on UNESCO to "cease efforts to attempt to
regulate news content."
70. "The Declaration of Tallories" was formulated and signed in Tallories, France in
May 1981 by representatives of 100 print and broadcast organizations from twenty nations,
including the U.S. It is a strong demand to UNESCO that attempts to formulate press rules
and to regulate news content be halted in the name of international press freedom, which
the Declaration terms "a basic human right." It finds domestic support in R.R. Cong. Res.
137, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H2329 (1981).
71. The U.S. often finds itself unable to acquiesce in UNESCO's pronouncements because of concern over infringements of the U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights. For example,
though the U.S. is surely one of the freest members of UNESCO, it has been reluctant or
unable to ratify such agreements as those dealing with civil and political rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 61, and with human rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, id. Furthermore, the U.S., with its tradition of and insistence upon individual freedoms, is often pitted against UNESCO's and the General
Assembly's new majority, which demands satisfaction of social needs; the U.S. serves as a
rallying point for the democracies. Theberge, UNESCO's "New World Information Order':·
Colliding with First Amendment Values, 67 A.B.A.J. 714 (1981) expresses cogently the
fears of many in the U.S. that there may be no way to reconcile the demands for a New
World Information Order with the democratic traditions and principles of a free press.
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uished from support for similar regulatory measures with respect
to other communications functions. U.S. communication law has
sharply distinguished the gathering of news, electronic transmissions from point-to-point, and print dissemination, from broadcast
dissemination. The radio spectrum has always been treated as a
scarce natural resource far less accessible to the average person
than other mass media. 72 And although great advances in electronic mass communication technology have caused some toquestion the accuracy of this assumption (especially as compared to
daily newspapers), the distinctions between the print and broadcast media and between broadcast and point-to-point transmission
persist. The well-defined and widely disparate domestic treatment
of the broadcaster, newspaper publisher, news gatherer, and
point-to-point common carrier would provide firm support for a
similar distinction internationally between the DBS broadcaster,
newspaper publisher, news journalist, and wire service. 73
72. Justice Frankfurter wrote in 1943 that it was important to remember
certain basic facts about radio as a means of communication-its facilities are
limited; they are not available to all who may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed
natural limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering with one another.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) (footnote omitted).
Although domestic broadcast regulation has recently been relaxed to reflect the lessening
of scarcity of terrestrial outlets, scarcity will continue to mark DBS technology for the foreseeable future. See notes 3 and 15, supra.
73. Although vigorous debate continues over the rationale for, and wisdom of, the
electronic/print first amendment dichotomy, differential treatment of these two media,
deriving ultimately from the public interest obligation imposed on all broadcast licensees by
the Communications Act, is firmly established. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). Broadcast stations are licensed, newspapers are not. Broadcasters are required to be fair and balanced in their coverage of controversial issues;
newspapers are not. Broadcasters must afford access to persons attacked; newspapers need
not. Sex, violence and indecent material can be banned from broadcasting, but not from
books.
The lines of conflict are drawn between the publisher/broadcaster's freedom to communicate and the public's right to know (or to exclude). Limitations on the broadcaster's
freedom to communicate have regularly been upheld against first amendment challenge by
the Supreme Court and other federal courts of appeal. The Supreme Court has said that
although broadcasters do have some first amendment rights, it is the public's "right to
know" and to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas
which is paramount over the broadcasters' right to disseminate information. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). However, over the same time period that the
Court has be affirming restrictions on broadcasters, it has granted new and broader
freedoms to news journalists and newspaper publishers. Under no circumstances has the
Court permitted a prior injunction against publishing information in a publisher's posses-
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Finally, U.S. policy on DBS must be consistent with domestic
law and with the constraints imposed upon the federal government by the first amendment to the Constitution. Any modification in this area must be principled and based upon a clear conceptual foundation to avoid undercutting domestic constitutional protections of the highest order.
Traditional first amendment analysis focuses on the prohibition of government intervention in the communication process. 74
This line of inquiry begins by asking what limitations, if any, the
first amendment imposes upon government regulation of information.75 The affirmative theory of the first amendment, which
underlies much of U.S. broadcast law, emphasizes the positive responsibility of the federal government to "unclog obstructions in

sion, even where the information has been unlawfully obtained from the government. New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). No matter how biased or scornful a
newspaper report on a public official may be, the official has no right of criminal complaint,
or of access to the paper to respond, and may recover under the civil law only if (s)he can
prove the report was both false and published with actual knowledge that it was to be likely
untrue. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). And finally, the Court has recently held that the first
amendment protects the journalist's right to seek information from public proceedings and
papers. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 535 (1980).
74. Domestic law has long grappled with the tension between governmental restraint
and communications freedom. Nowhere is the Surpeme Court's struggle and uncertain conception of communications freedom better illustrated than in New York Times Co. v.
United States, the landmark "Pentagon Papers" case, supra note 73. Although the ultimate
result of the case was that the executive branch of the federal government could not restrain publication of documents unlawfully obtained from federal files, the separate opinions
filed by each of the nine Justices reveal widely different understandings of the first amendment and its role in a democratic society. As Chief Justice Burger remarked in his dissent,
"Only those who view the first amendment as an absolute in all circumstances ... can find
such a case as this to be simple or easy." Id. at 748. Indeed, even the Court's foremost first
amendment absolutist, Justice Black, narrowly defined communication and refused to accept competing values to preserve the integrity of his absolutist position. Justice Black
believed that the freedoms of press and speech covered only printed and oral communication occurring in a passive context, and he refused to acknowledge a constitutional right of
individual privacy to be free of intrusive information gathering and dissemination. The
debate over first amendment values among the members of the Court will surely continue
and multiply with each new generation of communication technology. However, there are no
longer any absolutist justices on the Supreme Court, and the present justices seem inclined
to balance carefully competing constitutional values with the first amendment, while remaining sensitive to first amendment interests arising in an array of modern contexts.
75. As applied to international DBS broadcasting, the traditional theory would ask
whether the first amendment in any way constrains government regulation of imported and
exported programming and if so, whether these constraints are the same as those applied to
domestic broadcasting.
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the market place of ideas." 76 Under the affirmative theory of the
first amendment, government is not only permitted to intervene
in the communication flow, but, under certain circumstances, has
an affirmative duty to do so in order to broaden dissemination of,
and citizen access to, political, social and aesthetic ideas and information.77 An affirmative first amendment analysis would ask not
what the U.S. might do by way of regulating international DBS
service, but rather what it must do to provide its citizens with
some opportunity for cross-cultural communication. U.S. intransigence on its free flow policy to the extent of excluding international DBS service would be as offensive to the affirmative first
amendment theory as a federal government claim of an absolute
right to control imported and exported information, unrestrained
by the first amendment, would be to the traditional theory. Denial
of citizens' access to all cross-cultural communication by DBS, due
to insistence upon either an absolute right to communicate internationally or an absolute right to control U.S. international communications, would perpetuate, rather than unclog, current
obstacles to an international marketplace of ideas. 78
76. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). "It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by
Congress or by the FCC." Id. at 390.
77. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 653-67 (1970). After
describing the current concentration of control and scarcity of access in domestic mass
media, Professor Emerson states:
The result is that the system is choked with communication based upon conventional wisdom and becomes incapable of performing its basic function. Search
for truth is handicapped because much of the argument is never heard or is heard
only weakly. Political decisions are distorted because the views of some citizens
never reach other citizens and feedback to the government is feeble. The possibility of orderly social change is greatly diminished because those persons with the
most urgent grievances come to believe the system is unworkable and merely
shields the existing order. Under these circumstances it becomes essential, if the
system is to survive, that a search be made for ways to use the law and legal institutions in an affirmative program to restore the system to effective working
order.
Id. at 628-29 (emphasis added).
78. Professor Price's excellent paper on the first amendment constraints upon U.S.
policy on DBS, see Price, supra note 37, describes long-standing international concern over
transborder broadcasting, even in nations having strong free speech traditions such as
Great Britain and Canada. His analysis begins by asking the extreme question of whether
the first amendment imposes any constraint on federal government regulation of the import
and export of information; or, in other words, whether the first amendment has application
only to communication originated and received within U.S. borders. Professor Price asserts
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The affirmative theory, however, does not afford the federal
government unrestricted license to control communication flow.
Government intervention may not be undertaken for partisan political purposes. 79 Government may not determine truth or falsity
of ideas. 80 And government may not dictate the content of broadcast communication. 81 Government intervention under the affirmathat this narrow view would make a mockery of the principle of free and fair debate, but
finds little judicial support for the contrary position.
After rejecting this minimalist interpretation of first amendment scope, he then considers whether different standards might exist for internal and transborder communication.
In the broadcast area, Professor Price cites examples of limitations upon international communications which would be tolerated upon domestic communication: the first, an FCC
regulation which restrains broadcasters transmitting internationally from airing programs
which reflect adversely on U.S. politics and society, Price, supra note 37, at 58, citing 47
C.F.R. § 73.788(a) (1980), and the second, the statutory prohibition against alien ownership of
U.S. broadcast stations, Price, supra note 37, at 60, citing 47 U.S.C. §310 (1976). Although
these constraints upon the export and import of broadcast information have not been
squarely tested by the courts, Professor Price suggests that they would be affirmed
because of judicial deference to administrative and legislative determinations, especially in
the foreign policy field. Likewise, he believes it beyond question that the FCC could
regulate imported broadcast signals to insure compliance with domestic law on lotteries,
obscenity and, presumably, fairness. Finally, Professor Price cites examples of domestic
broadcast regulation (ownership, competition and content) as further support for the proposition that U.S. agreement to and participation in international control of DBS programming
would not offend the Constitution nor violate domestic laws. Id. at 57-68.
79. After affirming the FCC's chain broadcasting rules as applied to license awards in
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), Justice Frankfurter stated
for the court:
But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants
upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other
capricious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a
choice among applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly
different.
Id. at 226.
The issue did, of course, arise. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
1101, vacated as moot, 516 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976), which
involved NBC's broadcasting of the documentary "Pensions: The Broken Promise." The
FCC determined that the program violated the fairness doctrine, but the Court of Appeals
reversed on the basis that intervention by the FCC was political in nature, going to support
certain prospective legislation and to reject other proposals.
80. Thaddeus L. Kowalski, 46 F.C.C.2d 124 (1974); Neckritz v. FCC, 502 F.2d 411 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, vacated as moot, 516 F.2d 1180
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). See also note 79 supra.
81. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) states:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
See also Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 414 U.S. 914 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
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tive theory of the first amendment is tested by whether it results in expanded choice, and by whether the public has received a
greater array of communication and balance of belief. 82

VIII

AFFIRMATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AS
APPLIED TO DBS PROPOSALS

The affirmative theory, as applied by the courts and the FCC,
provides an interesting contrast to the present policy proposals
for international DBS service. While the affirmative theory might
tolerate the proposed U .S.S.R. code restrictions on DBS regarding
such things as pornography, racial hatred and narcotic use 83 (intended to make the programming more generally acceptable, and
therefore, of service to a wider audience), it would be offended by
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
82. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) in
which the Court of Appeals overturned an FCC decision to rely on the marketplace to provide competition; the Court said that competition might sometimes be inadequate to this
purpose, and that in such cases the FCC had a duty to intervene, e.g. to consider market
diversity in its deliberations regarding a format change application. In WNCN Listeners'
Guild v. FCC, 45 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1404 (1979), the FCC issued a policy statement
establishing its reliance upon market competition rather than agency regulation to provide
diversity. The Court of Appeals, in vacating this statement of policy, admonished the FCC
that the market may give an imperfect reflection of society's needs, and that the agency
should be ready to step in and regulate to promote diversity when necessary. Although the
Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals and supported the Commission view,
strong arguments are found on both sides and the issue may not yet be finally settled. See
WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
A discussion articulating the FCC's responsibility can be found in Emerson, supra
note 77, at 634. Emerson places the burden of proof upon the government proponent of the
regulation to establish
(a) that the control is clearly necessary to correct a grave abuse in the operation of the system and is narrowly limited to that end, and that this objective cannot be achieved by other means; (b) that the regulation does not limit the content
of expression; (c) that the regulation operates equitably and with no undue advantage to any group or point of view; (d) that the control is in the nature of a regulation, not a prohibition, and does not substantially impair the area of expression
controlled; and (e) that the regulation can be specifically formulated in objective
terms and is reasonably free of the possibility of administrative abuse.
Id.
83. 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(l)(D) (1976) provides that the Commission shall (m)(l) Have authority to suspend the license of any operator upon proof sufficient
to satisfy the Commission that the licensee (D) has transmitted superfluous radio communications or signals or communications containing profane or obscene words, language, or meaning ....
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963).
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direct attempts to determine what does and what does not \lndermine foundations of local culture and tradition, or misinform the
public. For example, although the FCC has sought in its rules to
provide an outlet for local community expression, it has attempted
to do so by requiring broadcast licensees to research and respond
to unique local culture; the FCC does not itself determine the foundations of a particular local culture. 84 Similarly, the FCC may require a broadcast licensee to give a more balanced presentation of
a public interest issue, but the manner in which other perspectives are presented and the amount of time allotted these perspectives are within the broad discretion of the broadcaster. 85 The
Commission never endeavors to determine truth or falsity, or
what is and what is not misinformation. 86
The affirmative theory also contrasts with the SwedishCanadian proposal in some respects. The affirmative theory would
not tolerate prior restraints or a government's arbitrary per program exclusion of DBS communication under the guise of prior
consent. Exclusion would be justified only where a state could
show a compelling need to protect the welfare of its citizens, or to
promote the development of new channels of communication. U.S.
law strives to check ad hoc or arbitrary administrative action,
especially as it applies to freedom of communication. The FCC has
repeatedly refused to engage in detailed inquiries into the daily
pr.o gramming and management decisions of the licensee, and has
84. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1973). For cases considering earlier FCC ascertainment policy, see Brown
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 9 F.C.C.2d 168 (1967), discussing the need to ascertain local needs
and to program to meet them; Almardon Inc. of Florida, 16 F.C.C.2d 395 (1969), requiring
that applicant survey his service area, set forth and analyze suggestions, evaluate priorities
and propose responsive programming; and Southern Minnesota Supply Co., 18 F.C.C.2d 824
(1969), establishing the need to ascertain and meet the needs and interests of the service
area.
85. See, Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); Applicability of the
Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C.
598 (1964).
86. The 197 4 Fairness Report in discussing accurate news reporting stated that it
would not be "useful or appropriate [for the FCC] to investigate charges to news misrepresentations in the absence of substantial extrinsic evidence or documents that on their face
reflect deliberate distortion," Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and the
Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, supra note 85, at 21. Moreover,
deliberate distortion will not prejudice license renewal unless it is shown that the licensee
was directly and knowingly involved. See also, Network Coverage of the Democratic National Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650 (1969).
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instead reviewed the broadcaster's composite programming record every three years when licenses are renewed to determine
overall balance and quality of public service. 87 The Commission has
never enjoined the broadcast of a program, nor summarily
ordered a licensee off the air. 88 And when the Commission does
act, its actions must not be tainted by partisan or political bias. 89 On
the other hand, the Commission has acted aggressively on matters
affecting the welfare of children, public health and safety, and community morals. 90 The FCC has also intervened in the communica87. "[A]ny approach whereby a government agency would undertake to govern dayto-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees endangers the loss of journalistic discretion
and First Amendment values." National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1119 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (referring to Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973)); see also, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 481 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The
FCC in granting this broad discretion to the licensee, has stated: "The genius of the fairness
doctrine has been precisely the leeway and discretion it affords the licensee to discharge his
obligation to contribute to an informed electorate." The Handling of Public Issues Under
the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 36
F.C.C.2d 40, 48, 24 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1917 (1972). This policy clearly establishes great
agency deference to broadcaster judgment. See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
1101 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also text accompanying note 92, infra.
88. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
"[I]ndividual licensees should be free to program as they see fit without judicial interference; ... neither the F.C.C. nor the NAB should be permitted to interfere with independent licensee decisionmaking." Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.
Supp. 1064, 1153 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The appropriate remedy in case of "a serious danger that
the defendants would ignore" other rulings and guidelines, is not at any rate ordering a
broadcaster off the air. Rather, the FCC issues gentle warnings, enforcement letters, and
finally, if necessary, cease and desist orders. The sanction of denying license renewal has
rarely been used. See D. GILLMORE & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW, 871-73 (3d ed.
1979); 47 u.s.c. §§ 312, 503(b)(l)-(5) (1976).
89. See Justice Douglas' concurrence in Columbia Broadcasting: the fear which provided the stimulus for the creation of the first amendment "was founded not only on the
spectre of a lawless government but of government under the control of a faction that
desired to foist its views of the common good on the people." Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See also note 82, supra.
90. Early on, service "inimical to the public welfare or contrary to the public interest"
was denied. Lottery Cases, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal
Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), denied service found to be against community
morals and public interest in that it included religious attacks, obstructed justice, and was
sensational rather than instructive or informative. Such denial of license did not violate the
first amendment, the court held, since other avenues of expression were freely available.
Justice Groner wrote:
If it be considered that one in possession of a permit to broadcast in interstate
commerce may, without let or hindrance from any source, use these facilities,
reaching out, as they do, from one corner of the country to the other, to obstruct
the administration of justice, offend the religious susceptibilities of thousands, inspire political distrust and civic discord, or offend youth or innocence by the free
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tions flow to nurture the development of new mass communication
services and thereby ultimately to expand mass communication
outlets. 91
The U.S. free flow policy shares with the affirmative first
amendment theory the goals of promoting communication and protecting the individual's right to be informed. However, there exist
substantial conceptual differences between the two. Free flow
policy is absolutist and values freedom of communication as an end
in itself. Affirmative theory is relativistic and values free communciation as a means to achieve popular enlightenment. Free
flow seeks the unfettered movement of information, whereas the
affirmative theory is equally concerned with the quantity of information and the diversity of sources. 92
The affirmative theory also suggests international procedural
possibilities. Domestically, the affirmative theory depends upon a
grand scheme of bureaucratic deference among appellate and trial
courts, the FCC and broadcast licenses. Appellate courts are
bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact, and may overturn
the trial court's decision only if there has been a clearly erroneous
application of law. 93 In reviewing FCC decisions, trial courts may
use of words suggestive of sexual morality, and be answerable for slander only at
the instance of the one offended, then this great science, instead of a boon, will
become a scourge, and the nation a theater for the display of individual passions
and the collision of personal interests.
Id. at 852-53.
Although standards have grown somewhat more lenient, there is still a definite protectionism toward youth, the public health and safety, and community morals. See
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Applicability of the
Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Amendment of Part 73 of the Federal Communications Commission
Rules with Regard to the Advertisement of Cigarettes, 16 F.C.C.2d 284 (1969); FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 414 U.S. 914 (1973);
Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc., v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1964 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
91. See, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
92. [T]he greatest distortions in our system of free expression have developed in
the mass media, and the efforts to eliminate these distortions have created many
of the most difficult and controversial questions. The principal goals of regulation
are (1) to create a greater diversity in the expression communicated by the media,
and (2) to give a greater number of individuals and groups access to the media.
Emerson, supra note 77, at 653. See generally, remarks of Professor Abram Chayes and Mr.
Harry Olsson in Control of Program Content, supra note 48, at 40-67.
93. See, e.g.' HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
32-36 (2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler eds. 1973).
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not substitute their judgment for that of the Commission, and
even where the court may disagree with the wisdom of an FCC determination, it will not reverse the Commission unless the determination was arbitrary, capricious or totally unsupported by the
tendered record. 9' And, as noted above, the FCC, in reviewing programming decisions of a broadcaster, may not substitute its judgment for that of the broadcaster, and can apply sanctions only
after holding hearings and finding the broadcaster's conduct clearly unreasonable and unwarranted. 95
Advancement of affirmative first amendment theory in U.S.
international communication policy would provide a new alternative to present policy proposals, new prospects for compromise, .
and a new degree of consistency between domestic and international communications law. Although the first amendment may apply different standards to domestic and international communications,96 the affirmative theory provides an opportunity to develop
an as yet unrealized congruity between domestic and international
law on the concept and meaning of freedom of communication.

IX.

THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 AND THE
MACBRIDE REPORT

Previous sections have suggested that it is possible for the
U.S. government to participate in some form of international DBS
programming review arrangement without compromise of its com94. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
[I]ndustry regulation has been entrusted by Congress "to the informed judgment of the Commission, and not to the preferences of reviewing courts." If an
agency has "genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making ... the court exercises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would on its
own account have made different findings or adopted different standards."
National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1974), citing Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968), Greater Boston TV Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
851 (1970).
95. "The FCC's function becomes that of correcting the licensee for abuse of discussion, as our [the court's] function in judicial review is that of correcting the agency for abuse
of discretion." National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See 47
U.S.C. §§ 312(c), 506(b)(3) (1976). See also notes 79, 87 and 88, supra.
96. Because of the foreign policy implications, the first amendment might grant
greater policy leeway to the federal government in the regulation of international communication than in domestic communication. Moreover, with respect to international communications, the federal government might have more flexibility to control outgoing information directed at persons not covered by first amendment protections, than to control incoming information directed as U.S. citizens. See , Comment, Direct Satellite Broadcasting
and the First Amendment, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J . 514 (1974). Although the first amendment

Published by SURFACE, 1981

41

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1981], Art. 2

306

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 8:265

mitment to international human rights and press freedom, and
consistent with the first amendment. This section considers more
particularly the ways in which accommodation might be reached
as to the actual operation of an international DBS organization.
The specific concern of this section is with the degree of divergence between the policies embodied in the Communications Act
of 1934 as they have been implemented, and the recommendations
of UNESCO's International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems (the MacBride Commission), should they be
implemented. 98 If the MacBride Commission recommendations are
supported by a. majority of states at the 1983 RARC, could the
U.S. join in a consensus on international DBS regulation consistent with the principles established in the Communications Act
and the rules of the Federal Communications Commission developed pursuant thereto? 99
does not apply to non-U.S. citizens, its guiding principles might usefully be applied in considering sales of telecommunications technology to other countries, such as the proposed
sale of telemetry to ARABS AT.
97. The Communications Act of 1934, supra note 17. For background reading on the
1934 Act, and on domestic communications law and policy generally, see M. FRANKLIN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW (1977 & Supp. 1979); D. GILLMORE & J. BARRON,
MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW: CASES AND COMMENT (1974); D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF
BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOWARDS RADIO, TELEVISION AND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS
(1979); W. JONES, THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA (2d ed. 1979).
98. The "MacBride Commission,'' the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, was established in 1976 by UNESCO Director-General AmadouMahtar M'Bow. Headed by Sean MacBride of Ireland, the Commission was comprised of
representatives of France, Zaire, Columbia, the U.S.S.R., the U.S., Indonesia, Tunisia,
Japan, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Egypt, the Netherlands, Chile, India and Canada. Its purpose
was "to undertake a review of all the problems of communication in contemporary society
seen against the background of technological progress and recent developments in international relations with due regard to their complexity and magnitude." MACBRIDE REPORT,
supra note 49, at xiv.
The culmination of the Commission's two years of work is its publication MANY
VOICES, ONE WORLD, id. . The report suggests the establishment of a New World Information Order, a proposal which has met with passionate and varied response worldwide. More
important, the study provides an invaluable collection of materials drawn from reports and
position papers submitted by national, regional, international, and private entities and
reflecting professional, academic and political views on every aspect of communications
from technology to policy. Because it draws together information and views from a multiplicity of sources and clearly reflects the developing balance of interests in UNESCO, the
Report is a seminal and invaluable source.
99. It should not be assumed that there is a high degree of consensus on the recommendations of the MacBride Report. The Theberge article, supra note 71, warns that
UNESCO efforts to implement the MacBride Report suggest that Western biases are likely
to be replaced by those of the Soviet Union and other antidemocratic nations. Popular
reviews of the MacBride Report in the U.S. press, led, as in many domestic first amendment
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The policies established by the 1934 Congress in the Communications Act addressed questions of both industry structure
and programming service. 100 The structural policies rested upon a
congressional declaration that the electromagnetic spectrum is
owned by the citizens of the U.S. Congress mandated that broadcasting services be allocated by the FCC equitably among the
several states of the U.S.,1° 1 that the FCC encourage the most efficient and effective development of new communication technology, 102 and that broadcast licensees operate in the public interest. 103
The content regulations settled upon by Congress rested on
the proposition that the electromagnetic spectrum is a scarce
natural resource and that broadcasting is an inherently limited
technology .104 As has been frequently stated by the courts, Congress recognized that if everyone had a right to broadcast, the
rights would be worthless and the public would lose the benefit of
broadcast technology. Therefore, government must allow some
persons access to broadcast technology while disallowing others.
However, those awarded the right to broadcast are not to hold
these rights for personal or selfish purposes, but as public trustees responsible to the citizens in their city of license. 105 This
issues, by the New York Times and Washington Post, have been uniformly and unreservedly critical. See note 69, supra.
U.S.S.R. reaction to the final text of the Report has been equally negative. Mr. Sergei
Losev, the U.S.S.R. representative on the MacBride Commission, set forth his concerns in
the General Comments. Mr. Losev criticized the Commission for discussing too widely the
right to communicate and for being caught up in the "old-fashioned and used trite formulas
such as the notion of a free flow of information." MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 279.
Mr. Losev asserts that these rights have. never gained international recognition, nor
recognition in any of the countries represented on the Commission, obviously including the
U.S. He concludes that the Report is too westernized and that it erodes the position of
developing countries by underplaying the role of Western mass media in damaging national
cultures. Id. at 279-80.
In fact one of the greatest strengths of the MacBride Report, its unification of diverse
viewpoints and information sources, also results in its greatest shortcoming. Sean MacBride
apologizes for the Report's superficiality and the necessity of lumping together issues and
viewpoints more validly considered individually. Such is certainly the case when considerations of press freedom fail to distinguish between print and broadcast media.
100. 47 u.s.c. § 301 (1976).
101. 47 u.s.c. § 307(b) (1976).
102. 47 u.s.c. § 303(g) (1976).
103. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312 (1976).
104. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943); and RCA Global Communications, Inc., 56
F.C.C.2d 660 (1975).
105. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prohibits the Government
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public trustee concept is the foundation of broadcast content
regulation in the United States.
The policies of the Communications Act are echoed in the
MacBride Report General Recommendations. The MacBride Commission urges that the geostationary orbit is a scarce natural
resource, that it is beyond private and sovereign appropriation,
and that its development must be for the common good of all persons.106 The MacBride Commission insists that access to the geostationary orbit and DBS technology be enjoyed equally by all
states and that those engaging in DBS operations not do so solely
for partisan, national or financial purposes. 101
Similarity between the policies of the Communications Act
and the recommendations of the MacBride Report should not be
surprising, since the 1934 Congress and the MacBride Commission
faced similar sets of technological and political constraints, albeit
one with terrestrial technology and the other with space technology. In both instances the new technology required a high degree
of centralized coordination and had to be implemented over a large
land mass containing multiple political units. In both instances the
new service would affect people from diverse regions having different local needs, interests and tastes. Both the 1934 Congress
and the MacBride Commission appreciated the great educational
and entertainment potential of the new technology, as well as the
risks of political abuse. And both explicitly recognized the need
for some compromise of the absolute right to communicate by the
new technology as a practical condition precedent to its implementation. Given these policy similarities between the Communications Act and the MacBride Report recommendations, one would
expect that domestic administrative rules and intiatives might be
responsive to certain of the MacBride Commission's concerns.

A.

Narrowing the Communication Gap Between Rich and Poor

A fundamental theme of the MacBride Report is the need to
eliminate among individuals and nations the gross material infrom requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself
as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which
are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
106. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 12-13.
107. Id. at 10, 96-99, 152-55, 260.
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equalities which threaten international peace. 108 The MacBride
Commission believes that widely unequal access to communication
technology perpetuates material disadvantage and dependency;
thus the Commission recommends the development of new communication opportunities as a principal means of promoting independence and self-reliance. 109 The U.S. has sought to reduce disparities in access to communication technology based on wealth.
The FCC has long attempted to provide parity of broadcast service between rural and urban communities and between small and
large cities through various schemes of cross-subsidization and
licensing preferences. 110
The FCC has confronted problems of urban income disparity
in formulating rules for the wiring of major cities for cable television. The FCC was rightly concerned that cable television companies, if left to their own choice, would wire the more affluent,
and disregard the poorer sections of the city. The FCC sought to
avoid this inequality by requiring review of cable installation
plans and timetables before granting franchises, and by offering
positive financial incentives to companies wiring disadvantaged
areas on an equivalent priority basis. 111 The FCC, followed by
state government agencies, has also sought to increase equality of
access to cable television technology by requiring cable franchisees to provide studio production facilities and channel time,
without cost and on a nondiscriminatory basis, to all persons and
groups in the community. 112
Less often appreciated but arguably the greatest source of
wealth equalization with respect to mass communication services
is the zero cost of broadcast programming. Broadcasting in the
U.S. today is free, a public good available to rich and poor alike.
No program production tax is levied upon the sale of television
108. See generally, MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 96-111, 123-34, 253-72.
109. Id. at 254-58.
110. G. GROSS & J. HERRING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND REGULATIONS 326
(1936); L. Johnson, Communication Satellites and Telephone Rates: Problems of Government Regulation, Rand Memorandum RM-12845-NASA, 14, 28 (1961); Policy Statement to
Section 307(b) Considerations for Standard Broadcast Facilities Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190 (1965); Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
111. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(2) (1980).
112. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, rev'd by FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). See also, Channels and Facilities for Locally Originated
Educational and Public Service Programming, Docket No. 90174 (New York Commission on
Cable Television).
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equipment, nor are direct or indirect charges levied for the reception of service. The primacy of free broadcasting in the U.S. communication system has often been affirmed. 113
The miracle of costless broadcasting, an essential element of
education and entertainment in contemporary U.S. society, results
from reliance upon commercial sponsorship to finance production
costs. Reliance upon a private capital base to finance U.S. broadcast services has not resulted in wealth discrimination with
respect to use and enjoyment, but rather has allowed for shared
access and experience across all income divisions. In contrast, programming by the public broadcasting system in the U.S. has been
widely criticized on behalf of low income and minority persons. It
is claimed that public broadcasting is elitist, that it programs exclusively for upper middle class audiences, and that it is a government subsidy to the rich. 114
Domestic experience with regard to commercial broadcasting
is therefore directly at odds with the bias of the MacBride Report
against the private sector. The MacBride Commission found that
"[t]he social effects of the commercialization of the mass media are
a major concern in policy formulation and decisionmaking by
private and public bodies," and recommended that "[i]n expanding
communication systems, preference should be given to noncom113. See, e.g., Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 164-65, rev'd by
·F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). See also Wiley, Introduction, Communications Law: Policy and Problems, 61 VA. L. REV. 465, 468 (1975).
114. The dissatisfaction has been cogently expressed by FCC Commissioner Benjamin
L. Hooks, who wrote in his dissenting opinion in Puerto Rican Media Action and Educational Council, Inc., 51 F .C.C.2d 1178 (1975):
By styling itself, preponderantly, as a Harvard liberal arts course, public broadcasting has forsaken those less privileged and influential whose cultural and educational needs are far more on a "street academy" or community college scale ....
Public television, without the legal or moral right to do so, has become the Caucasian intellectual's home entertainment game.
Id. at 1199 (footnote omitted). The reasons for public broadcasting's failure, or partial
failure, to meet its mandate of local and minority service are complex, but one major cause
is the lack of money. Federal funding cutbacks begun under the Nixon Administration will
be intensified in the Reagan Administration. Program choices are constrained by inadequate budgets; locally-owned and land grant college-based public broadcasting stations can't
affort to undertake programming themselves, but must acquire it from centralized sources
via auction. See note 41, supra. It should not be assumed that such purchase of a program is
necessarily a good indication of its popularity or desirability: for example, in the 1974-75
season programming auction, "[a]fter several rounds of bids, the top choice turned out to be
Japanese Film Festival, apparently because it was one of the least expensive offerings." S.
HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 188 (3d. ed. 1976). See also, Chapman, Down with Public
Television, HARPER'S, Aug. 1979, at 77.
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mercial forms of mass communication." 115 While few would deny
the need for some noncommercial mass media in society, the benefits derived from commercial mass media should not be underestimated, nor should its adverse societal impact be overestimated.
Mr. Elie Abel, the U.S. representative on the MacBride Commission, commented that "[a]t no time [had] the commission seen
evidence adduced in support of the notion that market and commercial considerations necessarily exert a negative effect upon
communication flows." 116 He further asserted that the MacBride
Commission is aware of the benefits of an independent media, and
that "market mechanisms play an increasingly important role [in
the media] today even in so-called planned economies." 117 Mr. Abel
cited support of courageous journalism as a benefit of commercial
mass media; he could also have added the wealth equalization to
which commercial media has contributed.

B.

Control of Commercial Content and Private Access to DBS
Technology

Reliance upon a private capital base and commercial sponsorship to finance DBS programming services is possible without ignoring the MacBride Commission's concern over the commercialization of the mass media and the potential for private abuse.
U.S. domestic law has also addressed these concerns. Historically,
commercial speech has been subject to far greater government
regulation in the U.S. than has political or other speech. 118 This difference in the degree of first amendment protection has been
justified by proposing a basic distinction between communication
for the purpose of pecuniary profit and exchange of money, and
communication for the purposes of intellectual provocation or the
exchange of ideas. 119 While recent Supreme Court cases suggest a
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
(1973).

MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 260.
Id. at 260 n.1.
Id.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376

Insisting that the exchange of information is as important in the commercial
realm as in any other, the newspaper here would have us abrogate the distinction
between commercial and other speech .... Any First Amendment interest which
might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might
arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is
altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction
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narrowing of the gap between commercial and political speech,
with commercial speech receiving greater protections than formerly, important distinctions allowing time, place and manner regulation of commercial speech, especially broadcast, persist. 120
Paid commercial broadcast advertisements are subject to
both FCC and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) scrutiny. 121 The
FTC monitors the accuracy and truthfulness of broadcast advertisements and has the power to ban misleading commercials and to
compel sponsor retraction of false claims. 122 The FCC has largely
been concerned with problems of excessive commercialization by
broadcast stations 123 and broader public interest concerns regarding the content and conduct of broadca.s t advertising. For example, the FCC, and later Congress, prohibited the broadcast of cigarette advertising; 124 and the Gommission has studied at length the
problems of advertising associated with children's television pro-

on advertising is incidential to a valid limitation on economic activity.
Id. at 388-89. These remaining discrepancies in constitutional status are premised upon the
assumption that commercial speech, since it is motivated by pecuniary profit, js more "hardy"
than political speech and, therefore, less likely to wilt in the chill of government regulation.
120. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), where the Court discusses
the permissible time, place and manner restrictions on advertising by attorneys and states
that "the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcasting media will warrant
special consideration." Id. at 384. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
121. See Licensee Responsibility with Respect to the Broadcast of False, Misleading or
Deceptive Advertising, 32 F.C.C.2d 396 (1961); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 27 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) 670 (1973); W. JONES, ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA, 276-79 (2d ed. 1979).
122. See Licensee Responsibility, supra note 121, at 400, 404, 405; FTC Statement on
Broadcast Ratings, 1 F.C.C.2d 1078 (1965); K Mart Enterprises, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 1 20,661 (1974); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
123. See AM-FM Program Forms, 30 Fed. Reg. 10,195 (1965); Television Program
Forms, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,228 (1966), suggesting a maximum of 18 minutes per hour of commercial messages for AM and FM and a maximum of 16 minutes per hour for TV. In reliance
upon competitive market forces to check excess commercialization, the FCC eliminated the
guidelines as to AM and FM in its recent Radio Deregulation rules, supra note 18. The
guidelines as to TV continue to apply. See WNJU-TV Broadcasting Corp., 57 F.C.C.2d 394
(1975). In addition, FCC rules delegating authority to the Broadcasting Bureau include
guidelines on the percentage of broadcast time to be devoted by television to non-commerical, non-entertainment programming. 47 C.F.R. § 0.281(a)(8) (1980).
124. "After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes in any medium
of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the F.C.C." Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). The constitutionality of the prohibition was upheld in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd
sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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gramming and has prohibited practices which tended to confuse
the programming and commercials in the child's mind. 125
Similar safeguards would be necessary if there is to be private commercial access to DBS technology. Inquiry by an international organization into the commercial advertising practices
which a private applicant proposes to follow, both as to the types
of commercial messages to be presented and the manner of
presentation, would clearly seem appropriate. Applicants limiting
commercial messages to announcements of support for program
funding, or to institutional advertising to promote national, firm
or industry goodwill, might be preferred over applicants proposing product advertising. There might also be selectivity as to the
particular products to be sold via DBS service. Review of the accuracy and the truthfulness of DBS advertisements and the
authority to ban misleading commercials and/or to compel sponsor
retraction would clearly be necessary .126
Additionally, the MacBride Report recommends consideration
of ways to reduce the influence of commercial mass media on national and international political processes. 127 U.S. communication
125. See Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 90.
On the basis of the information gathered in the course of the Commission's inquiry, it has become apparent that children, especially young children, have considerable difficulty distinguishing commercial matter from program matter ....
Special measures should, therefore, be taken by licensees to insure that an adequate separation is maintained on programs designed for children.
Id. at ,,47, 49.
126. See notes 121 and 122, supra, and accompanying text. It may be very difficult,
however, to go beyond this degree of regulation by applying, for example, fairness doctrine
concepts to balance product advertisements. At one point, the FCC flirted with the imposition of the fairness doctrine on broadcast product advertisements on the theory that commercials invariably emphasize only the positive aspects of a product, and the public has a
right to know the negative aspects as well. Because every product has some negative
aspects to someone, the Commission received a host of requests for enforcement against
varied products. The definitional and administrative difficulties inherent in the attempt to
balance the positive and negative aspects of every broadcast commercial caused the Commission to redefine its position and limit the fairness doctrine to paid announcements
presenting an express editorial opinion on a contemporary issue. Handling of Public Issues
Under the Fairness Doctrine, supra note 85, Part III (Application of the Fairness Doctrine
to the Broadcast of Paid Announcements), ,60. The FCC's reconsideration of the fairness
doctrine as applied to paid announcements was upheld in Public Interest Research Group v.
FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975).
The Commission was also unwilling to adopt an FTC proposal providing access for purposes of counter commercials, Matter of Handling Public Issues, Part III, supra, F2. See
also National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
127. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 260.
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policy has been sensitive to political and propaganda use of commercial access to television, and has sought to limit the use of
television by commercial entities for purposes other than consumer product sponsorship and promotion of company good will.
Paid commercial editorials ("aditorials") trigger the fairness doctrine and subject broadcasters to regulatory oversight. 128 For this
reason, the three major U.S. networks have uniformly refused to
accept paid editorial announcements by commercial entities. Indeed, even official political parties have no right under U.S. law to
purchase broadcast time to air their views. The Supreme Court
had held, in a case involving the Democratic National Committee,
that the national television networks can refuse to sell air time for
general political advertisements and that nothing in the Communications Act of 1934 nor the first amendment grants a right of
access to political parties. 129 In the opinion, Chief Justice Burger
straightforwardly addressed the inequalities inherent in a right of
paid political access to the broadcast media. The Court found that
under such a scheme, the wealthy would have far greater opportunities than the poor to advance their views and establish
political agendas, and that governmental attempts to devise compensatory schemes would involve cumbersome and intolerable involvement in daily broadcast programming. 130 The Court concluded
that the public right to know was better served by requiring
broadcast licensees to be fair in their coverage of issues, rather
than by allowing a right of access for a select few persons to present their views. 131 Similar limitations upon access by commercial
and political entities to DBS technology under a private system
would seem appropriate.

C.

Promoting Diversity and Choice in the Content of
Communication
Another major concern of the MacBride Report is that the

128. Part III (Application of the Fairness Doctrine to the Broadcast of Paid Announcements, Editorial Advertising), supra note 126. See Wilderness Society, 30 F.C.C.2d
643 (1971), applying the fairness doctrine to paid commercial messages by ESSO on the need
to develop Alaskan oil reserves and the lack of environmental damage.
129. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973). See generally, The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209
(1978).
130. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
120-21, 127 (1973).
131. Id. at 122-27.
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mass media be responsive to the unique needs and interests of
minority groups. The Report states:
Diversity and choice in the content of communication are a
precondition for democratic participation. Every individual and
particular groups should be able to form judgments on the basis
of a full range of information and a variety of messages and opinions and have the opportunity to share these ideas with others.
The development of decentralized and diversified media should
provide larger opportunities for a real direct involvement of the
people in communication processes. 132
132. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 266-67. It is important to note here that ongoing
attempts are being made, with varying degrees of success, to meet this need. The Report
mentions several regional cooperatives or news services, including CANA in the Caribbean
and PANA in Africa, which have recently been organized or instituted. Others in the planning stages include an Asian network, a Latin American Feature agency and a network involving the oil-producing countries and dealing primarily with problems and prospects in
worldwide energy development. Id. at 85-86.
LDC's are beginning to pool their resources for practical reasons as well as in furtherance of their goal to create a more balanced information flow. Communications undertakings require increasingly complex technology. Resources are pooled to acquire equipment, to train personnel (for example technicians, legal staffs, foreign correspondents and
editors) and to secure satellite potential.
There are also established and successful alternative international news services; the
News Agency Pool of Non-Aligned Countries (Pool) and the Inter Press Service (IPS) have
made gains and continue to develop. IPS, formed in 1964, is headquartered in Rome and includes regional (language-based) centers in Bogota, London and Tunis, and IPS Third
World, centered in Panama. IPS included (as of 1978) eighteen national news services, and
drew stories from a wealth of other (non-national) sources including the UN (and various of
its agencies), the Pool, the World Council of Churches, and so on. The emphasis of IPS reporting is on continuing process rather than spot event; IPS stories are longer than conventional news stories and provide in-depth coverage rather than (or in addition to) instant
news. IPS seeks to develop
[n]ew approaches to types of information to be transmitted ... [because] news of
the social process is in short supply in stories of the traditional agencies .... IPS is
trying to develop a kind of journalism "which focuses directly on the processes of
development ... to provide systematic and procedural coverage of the successes
and problems of development in the various Third World countries."
Hester, Inter Press Service: News For and About the Third World, in THIRD WORLD MASS
MEDIA: ISSUES, THEORY AND RESEARCH 83, 89 (1979), quoting Harris, The International Information Order: Problems and Responses, Research and Information Unit IPS (January 1979).
The Pool was formed in 1975 and three years later included more than fifty nations. Its
focus, like IPS', is basically upon development within its service area. Pool's objectives include increasing cooperation and understanding among non-aligned and lesser developed nations, and eliminating dependence on established news services. (The charges of "cultural
imperialism" to which Western journalists react with such outrage are leveled, it should be
mentioned, just as squarely at TASS as at UPI, AP and Reuters).
Although the Third World would like to turn the one-way news and information flow into
a balanced flow, there are clearly obstacles to the use by Western news services of the
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Mentioned in the Report as deserving of particular consideration
were the concerns of children, youth, and national, ethnic, religious and linquistic minorities. 133
Again, U.S. domestic law has addressed the same concerns
and has sought to stimulate programming reflective of, and
responsive to, minority life and needs. Chief Justice Burger has
been a leading force in this area as well. In a landmark decision,
which he rendered prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court,
he held that private citizens and groups have standing (a right to
participate and be heard) in hearings before the FCC and the
courts to contest the renewal of broadcast stations' licenses. 134 The
case, which involved complaints of racial discrimination against a
Mississippi television station, became precedent for many other
minority groups to redress grievances against radio and television
stations. Faced with the mutually unattractive prospect of prostories provided by IPS, the Pool and other such organizations. First, while it has been
charged that the developed countries simply don't care about the problems and concerns of
LDCs, since their audiences are viewed simply as purchasers of a commodity (news), it has
been maintained that very little foreign news, from whatever nation at whatever level of
development, is included in domestic services. See remarks of M. Masmoudi and E. Abel,
MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 147 n.3, 148 n.2.
Second, the nature of this news itself discourages such exchange. News which is
politically engendered and/or is edited and designed to convey a certain impression or viewpoint is not likely to find a warm reception from news services and audiences which seek unbiased and factual reporting. It may be "that a balanced flow of news is an unrealistic expection, and that internal restrictions on views in the Third World is an important (and
Western) explanation for a paucity of serious and vital news flowing to the West." Merrill,
"The Free Flow of News" and "Western Communication Imperialism": Divergent Views
on Ethical Issues' in THIRD WORLD MASS MEDIA: ISSUES, THEORY AND RESEARCH 27' 41
(1979). Government-sponsored news reporting may simply contrast too starkly with the
kind of investigative, sometimes anti-government, journalism to which many developed nations have become accustomed.
A third and related obstacle is the format of the news stories. The IPS/Pool emphasis
on process is arguably necessary and even laudable, but Western audiences may not have
the interest or desire to follow sustained, developmental journalism about areas and concerns in which they are not involved. "Spot coverage" as developed by Western news service probably responds to audience desires; the longer and in-depth stories from IPS or the
Pool may fail to appeal simply because of format.
Finally, although the gap is rapidly narrowing, the technical quality of programs
prepared by smaller, less sophisticated services may be partly responsible for the reluctance of the established international services to carry such programs.
Whatever the causes, it is clear that although the Third World news services offer an
important and valuable alternative to the established international services, a truthful and
truly balanced flow from genuinely diverse sources is not yet a reality.
133. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 168-69, 188.
134. United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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longed litigation, broadcasters and minority citizen groups frequently reach accommodation of interests through private negotiations.135 Some of the major concerns which have been addressed
in this ongoing dialogue include underrepresentation and stereotyping of groups in programming and inattentiveness or insensitivity to minority cultural values.
Other interest groups with more diffuse aims have also benefited from the liberalization of the standing rules. Groups concerned
with the quantity and quality of children's television programming,136 with avoidance of sex and violence during family viewing
hours, 137 and with the spread of spiritual or sectarian messages
have all received favorable forums in the Commission and the
courts. 138
The FCC licensing policies also reflect concern for minority
needs and interests by seeking to increase minority ownership of
broadcast stations through the provision of preferential tax treatment of transfers to minority-controlled corporations. 139 The Commission has sought further to stimulate diverse program service
by granting license preferences to Black and foreign language
radio formats in certain markets.
In these respects, U.S. domestic broadcast policy has embraced and encouraged the MacBride Report objectives of
democratization of communication and the removal of obstacles to
an open communication process and a free interchange of ideas, information and experience among equals, without dominance or discrimination. The absolutist position asserted by the U.S. in inter135. See Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees and the Public, 57 F .C.C.2d 42
(1975).
136. See Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 90.
137. See Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51
F.C.C.2d 418 (1975).
138. Religious programming poses special problems for the Commission. See Cox, The
FCC, the Constitution and Religious Broadcast Programming, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 196
(1965); Lacey, The Electric Church: An F.C.C. - "Established" Institution? 31 FED. CoM.
L.J. 235 (1979); Loevinger, Religious Liberty and Broadcasting, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 631
(1965).
139. See, e.g., Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978);
Clarification of Distress Sale Policy, 44 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 479 (1978). The FCC has also
cooperated with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to encourage affirmative
action programs for employment of minorities. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1980). Licensee performance under affirmative action programs is considered in conjunction with applications
for license renewals. See EEO Processing Guidelines, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 438 (1980). See
also note 45, supra.
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national forums is not only at wide variance with its own domestic
policies, but in the long run may work against the U.S. interest in
increasing transborder communication. The choice before the U.S.
may be either to insist on the absolute freedom to communicate, in
which case there may be no international DBS service, or to
modify its policy and agree to popular controls not inconsistent
with its domestic policies,1 40 in which case the people of the
Western Hemisphere might for the first time share in the common
cultural experience of broadcasting.
X.

CON CL US/ON

This article advances a principle of fairness as an alternative
to the polar positions of free flow and prior consent over international satellite radio and television transmission, with specific
reference to the upcoming 1983 Regional Administrative Radio
Conference of Western Hemisphere countries to determine international DBS policy. Under the fairness principle, transborder
satellite broadcasting would be both promoted and controlled by
multinational public and private institutions. Although some prior
consent would still be required under the fairness principle, countries would give their consent at the time they entered into international institutional arrangements to regulate DBS programming, thus avoiding the problems of unilateral and per program
censorship. It is concluded that adoption of the fairness principle
by the U.S. in international DBS negotiations would be fully compatible with domestic constitutional values and administrative
regulations, that the fairness principle has unique advantages as
compared with the other proposed policies for DBS, and that it offers the most promising route to implementation of transborder
satellite communication in the Western Hemisphere.
The fairness principle represents a common law, rather than
code, approach to the problems of international DBS service and is
140. See remarks of Abram Chayes in Control of Program Content, supra note 48, at
40-67.
[W]e have all departed a long way from the free flow of information concept as
an absolute principle and we are talking practicalities. All of us have a somewhat different view of practicality, but I think it is time to go back to what ... is the best
strategy for increasing the free flow of information .... Is it to try to impose our
moral absolutist view all around the world? Or is it to try to get something going
that we can expand and build up?
Id. at 65.
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more easily implemented on a regional level. Nonetheless, agreement among Western Hemisphere countries on the objectives and
institutional arrangements necessary for commencement of transborder broadcasting will take time and is unlikely to be achieved
by the 1983 RARC. This lag in consensus is particularly troubling,
since any initial structural or operational decisions made at the
1983 RARC regarding DBS service may, like initial decisions regarding other mass communication technology, have an enduring
impact and preclude future policy options. For this reason it is
suggested that some orbital assignments and transmitting frequencies be reserved expressly for international DBS service to
the people of the Americas at the 1983 RARC. Structural reservations for international DBS service would not only protect crossborder communication from foreclosure by national interests, but
would also serve to spur creative collaboration to utilize these
resources.
The potential of international DBS radio and television to advance common understanding and respect among people of different nations and cultures is great. Each generation of mass communication technology, from the advent of AM radio, has expanded
social communities and produced new appreciation of the common
needs and interests of people. With DBS technology, we are poised
on the threshold of international communities and the realization
of a better world order. Indeed, fulfillment of our present technological potential for cross-cultural communication may be our best
hope to avoid military confrontation. Why then, with the opportunities so rich and the aJternatives so grave, have the nations of
the world made so little progress in almost a quarter of a century
toward accommodation on DBS policy? It would seem that there is
a deeply felt concern (if not a fear) shared by developed and developing nations alike over the long term impact of radio and television. No country can be certain of how modern mass communication systems will affect social and political structures, or of how
people possessed of more information and freedom of choice will
choose to organize their society and to interact in the global community. On another level, there may also be an individual ethical
uncertainty which has undermined accommodation. Morality, after
all, has meaning only in the choices of free and informed men and
women. No one can be certain of the moral code by which free persons will exercise their freedom in the future.
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These governmental and individual uncertainties are easily
understandable and have been present at each stage of mass communication development. Solutions to these obstacles in the past
have come not so much from political negotiations as from a
shared faith in the future-faith in the promise of the technology
and faith in the common sense and compassion of people in the
utilization of new communication resources. Of all the nations of
the world, the U.S. should have confidence in the future of telecommunications technology and faith in freedom of information
and individual choice.
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